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Henry Wirz and the
Tragedy of Andersonville:
A Question of Responsibility
by Albert Winkler

War Guilt and the Civil War

The Civil War is still regarded as the most devastating conflict
in the history of the United States. Military operations, largely as an
outcome of Union policies, laid waste to huge sections of the country,
including the virtual destruction of several states including Virginia,
Tennessee, Missouri, Georgia, and South Carolina.' This caused much
suffering among the innocent, the weak, and many other noncombatants.
The number of civilians who lost their lives directly or indirectly from
the war is difficult to calculate accurately, but the finally tally would
have to be in the tens of thousands.
At the end of the Civil War, many Americans sought to place
blame for the great destruction and huge death toll in the war, now
estimated at about 750,000, but it could be as high as 850,000 men. 2
Since the Union won the war and controlled the military and legal
apparatus of the reunited nation, the leaders of the federal government
were in a position to ascribe blame and mete out punishment for the
perceived misdeeds in the war. There is no doubt that if the Confederacy
had won the war, the question of duplicity for crimes would have been
handled differently.
Much of the destruction of areas in the South were the result of
military campaigning and foraging, but the Union crimes during the war
included the wanton and deliberate destruction of the Shenandoah Valley
1
Recent studies on the destruction in the war include , Megan Kate Nelson, Ruin
Nation: Destruction and the American Civil War (Athens: U of Georgia, 2012) and Walter
Brian Cisco, War Crimes against Southern Civilians (Gretan , La.: Pelican , 2007) .
2
For the high fatalities in the war, see J. David Hacker, "A Census-Based Count of
the Civil War Dead," Civil War History 57, 4 (Dec. 2011 ): 304, 307-48.

2
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of Virginia and large sections of the states of Georgia and South Carolina.
Much of this ruin gave the North few, if any, military advantages, but
the victors never accepted blame for their own misconduct. Rather,
the Federals diverted attention from their own activities and charged
their adversaries with malice. In an attempt to hold their defeated
enemies responsible for perceived crimes committed during the war,
the federal government executed two persons after the conflict. These
men were Champ Ferguson, who was hanged for murder because of his
unconventional warfare in Tennessee, and Henry Wirz, who was put to
death because of the high death toll at the Andersonville prison camp.
Ferguson and Wirz were tried for crimes when other men who were
responsible for similar acts were allowed to go free.
The blame for the high mortality at Andersonville prison,
and Henry Wirz's supposed culpability, were points of contention for
decades following the Civil War as both sides in the conflict again
fought the war in print by leveling recriminations against each other.
These charges and countercharges often clarified many details on the
treatment of prisoners during the conflict, but they also clouded the
picture at times by presenting inaccurate information. The defamation
lessened little until the generation who fought in the war had died.
Fortunately, important recent studies have been produced both in the
United States and in Switzerland to aid in understanding this topic.
Among the first modern academic studies on the treatment of
prisoners of war at Andersonville and other camps written after the
participants had died was William Best Hesseltine's Civil War Prisons:
A Study in War Psychology which was first published in 1930.3 Another
excellent recent study is William Marvel 's Andersonville the Last Depot. 4
Unfortunately, Marvel's contribution was so impressive that R. Fred
Ruhlman plagiarized it in his Captain Henry Wirz and Andersonville
Prison: A Reappraisal. 5 In a book review of Ruhlman's work, Marvel
commented, "[I] discovered that Ruhlman had not only adopted my
evidence and my conclusions, but my organizational structure and, to

-' William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology (New
York: Ungar, 1964).
'William Marvel , Andersunville: The Last Depot (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press , 1994).
5
R. Fred Ruhlman, Captain Henry Wirz and Andersonville Prison: A Reappraisal
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2006).

Henry Win: and the Tragedv of Andersonville ...

3

Henry Win:.
an aggravating degree , much of my phrasing." In his review , Marvel
also included numerou s examples where Ruhlman had copied his work
word for word. Ruhlman's book had been published by the University
of Tennessee Press. When the press learned of Marvel's review, it
recalled the book, but many copies of the flawed work are still available
in academic libraries throughout th e country, and the study may still
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be purchased.6 While Ruhlman's book and his scholarship need to be
condemned, there is still a small amount of original material in the study
that is helpful.
Other recent studies vary in quality, but they can often be
helpful. These include Edward F. Roberts Andersonville Journey and J.
H. Sears, ed. Andersonville: The Southern Perspective.7 John W. Lynn's
800 Paces to Hell: Andersonville is a lengthy narrative relying largely
on primary sources, but the work suffers from a Jack of critical analysis,
and it also provides no bibliography of cited literature .8 However, Lynn's
work is a valuable as a tool in locating relevant materials.
By far the most complete and most reliable study to date
is "Captain Henry Wirz (Zurich 1823-Washington D.C. 1865)"
by Heinrich L. Wirz and Floran A. Strahm. 9 Heinrich L. Wirz is a
descendant of the one surviving brother of Henry Wirz, and Heinrich
has spent decades researching the topic. The book will be most useful
to scholars who can read both English and German, but, unfortunately,
it has not yet been published . This work is so inclusive on the materials
relating to Henry Wirz, that it will likely take the position of the most
important study of the Swiss officer for decades if not generations to
come. We can only hope that this book will soon be published and made
available to a wide audience. In the meantime, Heinrich L. Wirz has
most graciously allowed me to examine the excellent work for my use in
this study. But my intent is broader than to repeat much that has already
been written on Henry Wirz. The purpose of this article is to reevaluate
the career of Henry Wirz and to clarify little-known facts about him, to
reexamine the evidence against him , take a close look at the trial, and to
place the question of brutality at Andersonville in the broader context of
activities, policies, and atrocities during the Civil War.

6

William Marvel 's Review of R. Fred Ruhlman 's Captain Henry Wirz and Andersonville Prison: A Reappraisal in Georgia Historical Quarterly vol. 91, No. 1 (Spring
2007): 94-8.
7
Edward F. Roberts, Andersonville Journey (Shippensburg, PA: Burd , 1998) and
J. H. Segars , ed . Andersonville: the Southern Perspective (Atlanta: Southern Heritage ,
1995).
8 John Lynn, 800 Paces to Hell: Andersonville, a Compilation of Known Facts and
Persistent Rumors (Fredricksburg , Va : Kirkland's Museum, 1999) .
9 Heinrich L. Wirz and Florian A. Strahm, "Captain Henry Wirz (Ziirich 1823Washington D.C. 1865): Assistant Adjutant General (A.A.G .), His Life, the Prison Camp,
and the Trial-A Source Documentation" (unpublished manuscript, 2013)
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Henry Wirz's early Career
The man later known as Henry Wirz in America was christened
Hartmann Heinrich Wirz. 1° Clearly, the best way to understand
Wirz's early life and career is to examine what he said about himself.
Fortunately, he granted an extensive interview, which includes an
account of his early experiences, to a reporter from the New York Herald
newspaper on November 8, 1865 just two days before his execution.
The reporter simply asked for "such information concerning himself
as he was willing to impart." The newspaper man took down the reply
"verbatim," or word-for-word. Wirz stated that he would be honest in
his account claiming that "I have no secrets of my past life, nor of my
present." Wirz was born in the Froschaugasse of Zurich on November
25, 1823. His father, Hans Caspar Wirz, was originally a tailor, but the
older Wirz changed his occupation and later worked in the Custom
House in Zurich starting in 1834. Unfortunately, the family suffered a
number of tragedies. "My mother died in 1843. I have one brother and
one sister; she died unmarried in 1839. My brother is blind." 11
Hans Caspar Wirz and his son disagreed on how the younger
Wirz should earn a living. As Henry later admitted, "My father wanted
me to study for the pulpit; I did not like it." The issue of religion
probably caused friction between father and son. Even though Henry
was employed as a church recorder at the Fraumi.inster Church ([Our]
Lady Cathedral) in Zurich in 1845, he eventually became unhappy with
the Swiss Reformed Church. This was a likely reason why he did not
want to follow his father's wishes and study to become a minister in ·
that faith. He later stated, "My people used to be Catholics, I believe."
He converted to the Roman Catholic faith at some unknown date, but
he gave little indication on why and when he changed religions, stating
only that, "My religious faith I gained from my experience in life: I was
not educated in it." 12
10

A number of American scholars have mistakenly stated that Henry Wirz was originally Heinrich Hartmann Wirz. Recent research found that 14 sources (all in English) have made
that error. An additional 9 studies (6 in German) have his first two names in correct order.
11
Shortly before his execution Wirz gave an account of his life to a newspaper
reporter, see Henry Wirz, "His Life and History from his Own Lips," Nov. 8, 1865 , New
York Herald Nov. 9, 1865 . See also Boston Daily Advertiser Nov. 10, 1865. Hereafter
cited as Wirz, "Life."
12
Wirz, "Life."
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Henry wanted to be a physician, "I had an inclination to study
medicine, and he [his father] would not let me; finally he compromised
with me, and I was put in a commercial house. I staid in a large banking
house two years, in Zurich; then I went to Italy." In 1842, Henry was
employed by a commercial firm in Turin, Italy, but he did little work. In
fact, his time in Italy seemed to be a long vacation. "I travelled [sic] all
over Italy. I could not say that I staid anywhere; I wanted to travel." 13
Henry Wirz later claimed the he was "by profession a physician,"14 but there is no indication that he received a medical degree
from any university in Europe. Henry apparently received an education
to prepare him to become a merchant. The younger Wirz was back in
Zurich in 1845 working with his father. On September 15, 1845, he
married Emilie Oschwald, and she bore him two children, Louse Emilie
in 1847 and Paul Emil in 1849. 15
Early in 1847, Hans Caspar Wirz noticed some discrepancies in
the accounts of his business, including the loss of a box of silk, and he
asked the public authorities for an investigation. When suspicion fell
upon Henry, he was arrested on January 12, 1847, and he was convicted
of fraud and embezzlement on April 3. He was sentenced to four years
in jail and was sent to the 6tenbach penitentiary. Due to poor health,
the prisoner was released on June 6, 1848, and the city commuted the
remainder of his punishment to banishment from the Zurich Canton for
twelve years. Wirz went briefly to Moscow, Russia, where his brotherin-law, Hans Jakob Morf, lived, and he then migrated to the United
States, landing in New York in April 1849. His wife divorced him in
1853 for abandonment. 16
Initially, Wirz spoke no English, and he did odd jobs until his
ability to communicate improved. He was employed for a short time in
Lawrence, Massachusetts, as a weaver, a skill he had probably learned
in prison. When his ability to speak English improved, he also worked
13

Ibid. and Rolf Kieser "Hauptmann Henry Wirz und die Hintergriinde des Andersonville-Prozesses," Schweizerische Zeitschriftfiir Geschichte, 18, no. I (1968): 48.
14
Wirz, "Life" and Henry Wirz "Letter," to General J . H. Wilson May 7, 1865 in
U.S. Secretary of War, The Trial of Henry Wirz 40'" Cong., 2d sess., House Executive
Documents [Washington, DC, 1868], 17 . Hereafter cited as The Trial of Henry Wirz.
15
Wirz, "Life ," Kieser, "Wirz," 48, Orvid L. Futch, History ofAndersonville Prison
([Gainesville]: U. Of Florida, 1968), 16, and Ruedi Studer, Der Prozess gegen Captain
Henry Wirz und seine Hintergriinde 1865 (Nordhausen: Bautz, 2006), 40-1 .
16
Kieser, 48 and Futch, 16.
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as an interpreter for German workers in a factory near Northampton,
Massachusetts. The Swiss immigrant then moved to Kentucky where he
joined a physician, Augustus Webber, as an apprentice. After two months .
in Webber's employ, Wirz recognized that the man was a "humbug"
who "could not pay me my wages," and the Swiss left that position.
When he was still in the area, Wirz met and married Elizabeth Savells
Wolf, whose husband had died, leaving her with two young girls, Susie
and Cornelia Wolf. The couple spoke their vows on May 28, 1854 at
Cadiz, Kentucky, and they had two more daughters before the outbreak
of the Civil War, but one died before the conflict began. 17
The Swiss immigrant met Mrs. Levin R. Marshall at Natchez,
Mississippi, and her husband soon hired him "to take charge of one of his
plantations," at Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, where he was a physician to
the slaves. His wage was three hundred dollars per year, and his wife and
children joined him there in 1857. Apparently, he owned several slaves.
He was still in Louisiana at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, and
Wirz soon joined the Madison Infantry as a private. The Swiss private
was thirty-seven years old when the war broke out, and he was older
than most of the enlisted men and junior officers who served on either
side of the Civil War. Only senior officers tended to be his age during
the conflict. Wirz stated that he served the South out of conviction. "I
joined the Confederate Army in 1861 and served faithfully the cause I
considered [it] to be the rightful one." But he was not in a position to
protect his home from the Federal soldiers. "In 1862 the United States
troops destroyed my home, and my wife and three children had to seek
shelter among friends. I lost all I possessed but a few negroes who still
remained loyal." 18
Arriving in Virginia shortly after the First Battle of Bull Run
(Manassas), which took place on July 21, 1861, the Madison Infantry
was given guard duty over Union prisoners of war at Howard's factory
in Richmond. Wirz soon noticed that there was no formal list of the
captives, and he took the initiative to make one, probably relying on the
training in record keeping he received in his father's commercial house.
When Wirz's diligence came to the attention of Brigadier General John
H. Winder, who had responsibility for the Union prisoners at Richmond,
17

Wirz, "Life," Studer, Der Prozess, 40-2, and Marvel, Andersonville, 35-6.
Wirz to the New York News August 27, 1865 as cited in [S. W. Ashe], Trial and
Death of Henry Wirz (Raleigh: Uzzell, 1908), 32.
18

8
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Sherman's March by Alexander /-Jay Ritchie. Courtesy: Library of Congress.
the officer observed , " That's just what we want." On August 26, 186 I,
two days later, General Winder had Wirz placed on detached service
under his authority, and he soon advanced the Swiss guard to the rank
of sergeant. 19
William Howard Merrell, a Union prisoner, gave an early
account of Wirz as a prison administrator. The captive indicated
that the "Switzer named Wurtz'' was a " vulgar swaggering fellow."
Wirz had a temper , but there wa s little indication that he was a brutal
man. In fact , he was the object of derision and ridicule. Sergeant
" Wurtz" used "excessively amusing" jargon , and the prisoners had
fun pretending to misunderstand him. which sent their jailor into "a
spasmodic rage." When a captive escaped, Wirz ''entered the prison in
a towering passion, and with a series of frantic gestures commanded
the prisoners to fall in for roll-call." When the men refused to respond,
the Swiss insisted they answer, " or you will be very sorry in your
life. I shall keep you tree tays on pred and wasser." The men acted
pleased and shouted, "Three cheers for Wurtz. He will keep us three

I ') Wirz , ''Li re:' Studer, 42 , Marvel. Andersom•ille' 36, and the War of the Rebellion:
a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols.
(Washington , D.C.: Gov. Printing Off., 1880-190 I) series 2 vol. 3: 71 1. Hereafter cited as
OR.
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days on bread and butter!" Wirz responded, "No, no, you tam villains.
I say pred and wasser-wasser, not busser!" The Swiss even seemed to
play along with the jokes to a degree, and he said his acts of "petty
tyranny" could get him executed. If the North took him prisoner, "Dey
will kill me sure! ... I am certain dey will kill me so quick ... dat I
shall know nothing about it." 20
Merrell's descriptions were clearly intended to amuse his
audience, but he also indicated that the captives had little to fear from
Wirz. If the Union prisoners in Richmond were actually afraid of severe
reprisals from the Swiss, they would have been reluctant to aggravate
him. Wirz's supposed statement about his possible execution was in
keeping with Merrell 's continued attempt at humor. The prisoner
failed to mention any crime for which Wirz could be executed, and it
is doubtful that the Swiss actually thought he had done anything that
would merit death. However, this alleged observation was prophetic
in one sense because the government executed Wirz three years after
Merrell published his account.
Merrell's narrative also raises the question of Wirz's ability
to use the English language. Wirz clearly had an accent, and some
of the accounts of his speech indicate that he never mastered simple
pronunciation, the use of terms, or proper word order. Solon Hyde was
a Union prisoner who worked with Wirz at Andersonville. While he
often criticized his Swiss jailor, Hyde was not wholly unsympathetic to
the commander of the stockade, but he found much wanting in Wirz's
speech. It seems that the Swiss spoke with fractured English when he
was angry or excited. He also used threats and many profanities when
he was barking out orders. As Hyde recalled many years later, Wirz
spoke something like this: "Get in de ranks dere. Got damn you, get
in de ranks, or you shan't have a got-damned mouthful to eat to-day.
Guardts, vhy in hell don't you standt dem up; get up dare. I say, py
Chesus Christ, vhen I wants you to set down I tells you." 21
Hyde stated that on another occasion Wirz related that one of
his daughters had discovered a trick by one of the prisoners who wrote
a letter using milk that could only be read when the paper was held
up to a candle. Reportedly, Wirz said, "Yell, don'd you see, she was
20
W. H. Merrell, Five Months in Rebeldom: or Notes from the Diary of a Bull Run
Prisoner in Richmond (Rochester: Adams, 1862), 30-2.
21
Solon Hyde,A Captive of War (New York: McClure, 1900), 188.

November 2014 SAHS Review

10

reading over from de letters out from the box of de prisoners, don'd
you see, und pretty quick she comes to one what don'd be written on
at all. 'Vhat the idea is?' she said to me, 'dat dis one don'd be written
on no more. Dot Yankee makes one great meestake mid dose.' But py
und py, pretty quick, she goes to de candle mit it, to see off not de ink
be poor, und py chance she looked it drough, and it was shust so full
mit writing as it could be. 'Ho, yo! vaht fer ting is dot for writing?' she
says." 22 Hyde never explained how a hungry captive at Andersonville
could have gotten milk to write the letter. Children rarely learn their
accents from their parents. Most often, they copy the pronunciation of
other children, so Wirz's representation of the speech of his daughter
reflected his problems with the language not hers. 23
Despite his supposed challenges with spoken English, Wirz
apparently had no trouble being understood when he spoke to his
fellow officers, when he was interviewed by the press, when he wrote
letters, or when he gave statements in court. The stories about Wirz's
cumbersome language almost all come from Union prisoners trying
to make him look foolish or stupid. Also, his correspondence during
the war and the diary he supposedly wrote after the conflict either
demonstrate that he had an excellent command of written English,
or that he had skillful editors that made him appear to be more
accomplished than he actually was.
William C. Harris was another prisoner at Richmond early in
the war, and he gave additional information on Wirz and his conduct.
This Union captive indicated that the Swiss was less than harsh with
the prisoners, but he was a stickler for detail. Harris referred to Wirz as
being "Dutch." This term was a common error by Americans at the time
because to them Dutch actually meant German. Few Americans could
distinguish between a German and a Swiss accent, and they probably
saw little significant difference between the two nationalities anyway.
The captive stated that "The Dutch Sergeant [Wirz] of the
Post ... appeared to be the essence of authority at the prison." He was
the "Commanding officer, officer of the day, and roll-sergeant." Wirz
seemed responsive to the needs of the men, "Was any thing wanted?
22

Ibid., 294.
For more on language acquisition see, Thomas Scovel, A Time to Speak: a Psycholinguistic Inquiry into the Critical Period for Human Speech (New York: Newbury,
1988).
23
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Ask the Dutch sergeant. Would any thing happen soon? Ask the Dutch
sergeant." Harris found the Swiss guard to be "a good fellow at times,
and a very bad one at others." The Union captive also stated that Wirz
"Would show his angular smile of half-stubborn good humor to-day,
and curse us in his fragmentary English to-morrow." On one occasion,
two men got out of the prison, and Wirz told the men. "Gentlemen,
two of you have got out. Must call de roll. I saw 'em go but a minute
ago." After the roll call, Wirz ran outside stating, "I know where dey
is! I can catch dem." The escape was unsuccessful because scouts
searching for runaway slaves caught the escapees and sent them back
to the prison. 24
Wirz was sent to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and "He left us on 22"ct
of November, 1861, in charge of Federal officers and men transferred
thither as prisoners of war." The prisoners at Richmond soon learned that
the captives in Tuscaloosa apparently appreciated the Swiss sergeant.
As Harris reported, "By a letter thence we have been informed of his
popularity, owing to his obliging nature. He fills the important post of
commissary at Tuscaloosa, and is still noted for his infallibility and
usefulness ." 25
Significantly, the prisoners at Tuscaloosa were not the only
persons to give Wirz praise for his activities at that location. When
the citizens of the community learned that Captain Elias Griswold was .
to be "transferred from the command of a prison in this city," they
were anxious that Wirz replace him. They wrote a letter to General
Winder, explaining that "the large increase of prisoners here, present
and prospective, makes us anxious that his successor shall possess
the prudence, discretion, firmness, decision and energy, which he has
exhibited during his continuance at this military post. We believe that
Henry Wirtz [sic], his efficient assistant, possesses all these qualities in
an eminent degree. We respectfully recommend him, for that office."
Sixty-one members of the community signed the petition.26
The Swiss guard returned to Virginia in 1862, and he later
claimed that he participated in the battle of Fair Oaks (Seven Pines)
24

William C. Harris, Prison Life in the Tobacco Warehouse at Richmond (Philadelphia: Childs, 1862), 135-6.
25
Ibid., 135-6.
26
"Henry Wirz" to "Military" to "U.S., Confederate Soldier's Compiled Service
Records, 1861-1865," www.ancestry.com.
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which took place on May 31 and June 1, 1862, where "I was wounded
by a piece of shell." He added, "I was very seriously wounded at the
battle of 'Seven Pines,' .. . and have nearly lost the use of my right
arm." 27 Apparently, the wound did severe damage to the arm between
the elbow and wrist. It never healed, and the trauma gave the Swiss
much pain for the rest of his life. Even though Wirz was advanced to
the rank of captain on June 12, 1862, his damaged arm kept him from
any kind of field command, and he continued to work with prisoners
of war, which usually involved activities that were within his physical
abilities. 28
Wirz 's presence at the battle of Fair Oaks would be unexpected.
He was not assigned to any combat unit at that time, and there was
no reason why he should have been involved in the encounter. Since
the battle took place near Richmond, Virginia , the Swiss could have
understood the danger to the capital of the Confederacy and came
forward to offer his services at a trying time for his nation. If it was
not a fabrication to explain his damaged arm, his participation in the
engagement was a courageous act.

Arm bones of Henry Wirz.
Courtesy: National Museum of
Health and Medicine .

Rig ht Radius and Ulna of Capt. Wirz

27
28

Wirz "Life" and Wirz "Letter" May 7, 1865 in The Trial of Henry Wirz , 17.
Studer, 43.
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Autopsy of Henry Wirz.

During his trial in 1865, Wirz was accused of ordering his men to
fire on Union prisoners at Andersonville, but the captain clearly showed
a different attitude early in the war, and he immediately arrested a guard
for accidentally shooting a captive in Richmond in September 1862. 29
Confederate authorities were always anxious to exchange prisoners of the
war with the Union , but to accomplish this , they needed a full account of
the men held in captivity. Unfortunately, a list of 6,000 men was missing .
For months, Wirz traveled through many areas of the deep South in search
of the list, but he never located it. 30
Wirz received a medical leave for three months, and he soon
got another furlough for an additional four months " to go to Europe
on account of my health ." Hi s trave l was so delayed , probably because
of difficulties getting through the Union naval blockade of the South ,
that the Swiss guard arrived in Liverpool , England, only three weeks
before hi s leave was set to expire, but he remained in Europe seven
29

30

Wirz to Winder Sept . 5, 1862 in OR Series 2, vol. 4, 87 1.
Marvel, 37.
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more months. He explained his medical treatment, "I went to Europe
and had my wound operated upon at Paris. The doctor there thought
that all the dead bone had come out." But three or four months later,
"the wound broke open again," leaving Wirz in a challenging medical
condition for the rest of his life. The Swiss guard eluded the Union
blockade again and arrived at Wilmington, North Carolina, on January
20, 1864. General Winder soon ordered him to report to Camp Sumter
near Andersonville, Georgia, to help with the prisoner-of-war camp
there, and Wirz arrived in March 1864.31
The Swiss captain's medical problems probably were
associated with his wound, but he had suffered from scurvy and other
ailments as well. C. M. Ford, the "acting assistant surgeon in the
army of the United States," examined Wirz after the war and testified
that the former prison commander had suffered from scurvy. The
physician, John C. Bates, knew Wirz at Andersonville, and testified,
"The impression of some of the medical gentlemen at Andersonville
... was, that there was in his system a constitutional syphilitic taint
[infection]. There is, it seems to me, an intermingling of the scorbutic
[scurvy] and syphilitic taint." 32 After Wirz had been hanged, his body
was subjected to an autopsy for no stated reason. Maybe the effort was
simply to humiliate the much-hated Swiss even further. The physicians
who examined his corpse reported that he had an "aortic insufficiency"
consistent with syphilis. 33
Solon Hyde was a prisoner at Andersonville who was a "hospital
steward" for the Union Army. He worked to dispense medications at the
prison, and he wrote about the commander's wounds and how they were
treated. Wirz "had some very bad ulcers on his limbs, of a character that
required mercurial treatment, and he usually came to the dispensary after
an ointment that we prepared from simple cerate [ointment for external
use] and calomel [mercurous chloride] rubbed together." According
to Hyde, Wirz wanted as much of the mercury treatment as possible,
and the Swiss commandant supposedly said, "Make him [the ointment]
strong mit the calomel." Hyde responded that the mixture was more than
31

Ibid., 37-8, Wirz, "Life," and The Trial of Henry Wirz, 804
Ford and Bates in the The Trial of Henry Wirz, 804-5 . See also "Scorbutic" and
"Taint" in Websters Complete Dictionary of the English Language (London : George Bell,
1886), 1182 and 1348.
33
Ruhlman, Wirz and Andersonville, 213.
32
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the accepted amount, but the captain responded , "Py Gott! I cares not
for <lat; I takes de law into my own handts. Make him two-three times
as strong." The prisoner then made the ointment as strong as possible,
and the commandant stated, "Hi-yi, <lat is goot! Das is right." When the
Swiss came back later, he ordered, "Make him shust like dot last; it was
just right." 34
The use of mercury to treat sores at that time was hardly unusual,
but other treatments were available. While many American doctors were
still unsure about the causes of infection during the Civil War, they
knew that pouring alcohol on wounds often kept them from festering,
and the practice of using distilled beverages on injuries likely saved
many thousands of lives. A Union soldier, Alfred Bellard, described the
treatment of his wound caused by a bullet that went completely though
his leg. "One of the nurses poured some kind of liquor on the wound,
and running in at one hole, and out the other." 35
Wirz could have used alcohol on his ulcers, but that treatment
was apparently ineffective in his case. The serious side effects of using
mercury, which often caused the user to have a violent temper and
eventually to become insane, were well known at the time. The adoption
of this medication was consistent with the argument that the Swiss had
syphilis, and the treatment involving mercury might help explain why
Wirz had such an explosive temper.
Recently, modern physicians have argued that taking mercury
internally could have contributed to Abraham Lincoln's violent
outbursts .36 The fact that the commander at Andersonville had syphilis
was not too surprising because many other men were infected with the
malady at the same time . Medical records indicate that between 8 and
9 percent of Union soldiers had syphilis during the war. The percentage
of Confederate troops who also had the malady are unknown, but they
were probably less. 37
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Andersonville sketched by R. K. Sneden, a former prisoner.
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The Agony of Andersonville

The Swiss guard's fate became associated with the tragedy of
Andersonville, and Wirz was later condemned for the conditions in the
camp, but these circumstances were an outcome of the policies relating
to prisoners during the Civil War. A system of prisoner exchange, known
as the cartel, was arranged on July 22, 1862. Under this agreement,
both the Confederacy and Union exchanged prisoners man for man. The
cartel functioned well until the end of the year, but it soon began to break
down. On July 17, 1862, the US Congress ratified the Militia Act of
1862, allowing the Union army to employ African Americans as soldiers.
Also Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which went into
effect on January 1, 1863, reiterated that the Union would accept Black
Americans as troops. African Americans were soon deployed against
the enemy, and some were captured, but the Confederacy refused
to treat these men and their white officers as legitimate prisoners of
war. Confederate officials even threatened to enslave the troops and
execute their officers for inciting a slave uprising. When the Lincoln
administration threatened to retaliate, the prisoner exchanges became
more difficult to arrange. The cartel collapsed entirely by the end of the
summer of 1863, and the number of prisoners held by each side rose
sharply. 38
The conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps on both sides of the
conflict were challenging, and high mortality rates followed. General
Ainsworth probably presented the most reliable numbers relating to
soldiers who were captured or paroled. Soldiers who were paroled had
been captured but were released on the battlefield, yet they were not
allowed to return to their units until they were properly exchanged when
like number of the enemy troops were also taken prisoner and released.
Ainsworth stated that "211,411 Union soldiers were captured during
the Civil War of which 16,668 were paroled on the field and 30,218
died while in captivity; and that 462,634 Confederate soldiers were
captured during the war, of which number 247 ,769 were paroled on the
field and 25 ,976 died while in captivity." This meant that over 12% of
the Confederate soldiers died, and 15.5% of the Union men perished
38
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while in captivity. 39 These numbers demonstrate that the conditions in
camps both North and South were similar because the death rates were
comparable.
But these figures are misleading in at least one respect. As their
fortunes collapsed, the percentage of Confederate troops captured late
in the war was higher than earlier in the conflict. This meant that more
Southerners were held for shorter lengths of time because they were
soon released when the war ended, and consequently they would be
less vulnerable to the problems that came with lengthy incarceration.
Therefore, these men were less likely to die in captivity, which is a
factor that helps explain why the percentage of Confederates who died
in captivity were lower than their Union counterparts.
By 1863, the Confederacy was suffering from shortages of
all kinds, and public officials in Richmond were hard pressed to meet
the needs of civilians, soldiers, and prisoners of war in the city and
the area nearby. The Confederate capital was connected to much of its
nation's resources by a single rail line that was inadequate to meet the
transportation requirements placed on it, and the needs of the captives
reduced the amount of supplies for everyone else and drove up prices.
Since the prisoners in and near Richmond were close to the scene of
military operations in northern Virginia, the captives were military
targets for Union cavalry raids.
Incriminating documents were found on the corpse of Union
Colonel Ulrich Dahlgren, who was killed in the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren
raid from February 28 to March 4, 1864, which underscored the opinion
that the prisoners were liabilities. These documents stated that one of
the objects of the raid was to free the Union prisoners at Belle Isle, and
with their help, the cavalry would "destroy and burn the hateful city ..
. and Jeff. Davis and cabinet [would be] killed." 40 The Federal plan to
use prisoners of war as combat troops against the Confederate capital
and government officials demonstrated that the captives near Richmond
were a liability, making a move to camps father away from the scene of
action to be more imperative.
39
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In December 1863, Captain W. S. Winder and General Howell
Cobb selected Andersonville, Georgia, as the best location for a large
prisoner-of-war camp officially called Camp Sumter. As Jefferson Davis
explained, the prisons around Richmond were beyond capacity, and
they were "also beyond the ability of the commissariat to supply them."
Since "a large part of the food for our army in Virginia was drawn from
the more southern and southwestern States" more foodstuffs should be
available there. Andersonville "was selected after careful investigation
... it was in a high pine-woods region, in a productive farming country,
had never been devastated by the enemy, was well watered and near to
Americus, a central depot for collection the tax in kind and purchasing
provisions for our armies. The climate was mild, and, according to the
best information, there was in the water and soil of the locality 'no
recognizable source of disease."' 41
However, the decision by Captain Winder and General Cobb on
the location of the camp proved to be less advantageous than originally
assumed. The site of the compound was too near the battlefields of 1864,
meaning that transportation and the availability of supplies would be
hampered by military action, especially the Union cavalry raids aimed at
Georgia's rail system led by General Hugh Kilpatrick. 42 The flow of the
stream running through the camp in December had slowed considerably
by the next summer, making good hygiene difficult for the prisoners,
and many maladies soon appeared in the enclosure.
The initial compound was designed to hold ten thousand men ,
but work on the facility was delayed because few tools were available
locally, and Captain Winder had to get permission from the Confederate
officials to requisition the needed support from the small population
in the area. The initial intention was to construct wooden buildings to
house the captives , but a lack of saw mills in the area available to cut the
planks slowed this effort. Equally important, the effort to supply food
for the prisoners was hampered by the few grist mills in the region and
the lack of men available to drive cattle to the prison. Problems with
transportation also hampered efforts of construction and supply. When
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the first pri soners arrived on February 27, 1864, the compound was not
prepared to receive them, and only a stockade was in place with walls
fifteen feet high , enclosing sixteen and a half acres. About four hundred
captives were soon arriving on many days, and the number of prisoners
grew dramatically, taxing the ability of the Confederate authorities to
care for them .43
The average number of men in the prison was 7 ,500 in March ,
and there were I 0 ,000 men in the stockade in April. The numbers
increased to 22,291 in June , to 29,030 in July, and to 31,678 at the end
of that month. In August the pri so n held its greatest number of captives,
33,006. At the same time, the number of deaths rose rapidly. In March
283 prisoners died, in April an additional 576 expired, May 708 , June
1,201 , and July 1,817. The late summer months of August (2,993 died)
and September (2 ,677 died) were especially severe when the average
of nearly 100 men expired each day. In October I ,595 died, November
43
Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons , 133-5. See also OR Series 2, vol. 6: 965-6 , 992-3,
1000 , and 1043.
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Prisoners awaiting rations at Andersonville.
499, December 165, January ( 1865) 197, February 147, and March 108.
The last recorded deaths were in April, when 28 men died. According
to this list L2,994 (other historians state 12,913 or 12.949) men died
at Andersonville from a population of about 41,000 men who were
incarcerated there in all. 44 During those months only I ,462 soldiers were
on duty to guard the captives, meaning that there were only enough men
to guard the perimeter of the compound.
The men died from many maladies including exposure ,
hunger, unsanitary water, scurvy, and poor hygiene. In defense of
the Confederacy's policy of treating prisoners, Jefferson Davis wrote
that the reasons for the high death rate included: "insufficient means
of transportation," too few doctors. too few guards clue to the lack of
44

Hesseltine, Civil War Priso11s, 143, 146. 152: Davis. Ghosrs. 30 . 72; and Marvel ,
238 ; and Robert Scott Davis, Ghosts a11d Shadows ofA11derso11ville: Essays 011 the Secret ·
Social Histories r~f A111erica '.1· Deadliest Prison (Macon: Mercer U. 2006), 30, 72. Hereafter cited as Davis, Ghosts.

November 2014 SAHS Review

22

manpower in the South, and too few physicians were available for prison
service. He also pointed out that the Confederate congress passed a law
on May 12, 1861, mandating that all prisoners of war be given the same
rations "in quantity and quality as those furnished enlisted men in the
army of the Confederacy," 45 but he failed to prove that this rule was
actually followed in the treatment of prisoners.
Transportation problems plagued the Confederacy from the
· beginning of the war, and these issues became more acute as the conflict
progressed. Many horses and mules were taken to help support the army,
making the moving of goods more challenging. The rail system in the
South was inadequate at best throughout the war. Also, it continued
to deteriorate as more pressure was placed on it, and as Union raids
sought to damage it. By the spring of 1863, food riots broke out in many
southern cities including Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia; Mobile,
Alabama; Salisbury, North Carolina; and Atlanta, Georgia, meaning the
transportation was inadequate to these cities.46
The suffering of Confederate soldiers due to a lack of food was
often acute throughout the war, and the soldiers of the South often took
desperate measures to secure foodstuffs. John 0. Casler reported on how
he got food at the Battle of the Wilderness May 5-7, 1864. "We would
get them [rations] from the [Union] dead. I have been so hungry that I
have cut the blood off from crackers and eaten them." 47 The Union knew
well the plight of the Southern armies. The Federal General, Benjamin
Butler, wrote about the meager rations issued to the Confederate troops
in 1864, "A soldier of our army would have quite easily starved on the
rations which ... were served out to the Confederate soldiers."48 The
Confederacy was so hard pressed that it could not feed its own people or
properly supply its army. Under these trying circumstances, the South
could hardly be expected to keep Union captives from suffering as
well.
Initially, the prisoners were just turned loose inside the
compound at Andersonville. No order had been established in the
nature of their housing, and the men rested much where they pleased.
45
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By the time Captain Wirz arrived on March 25, 1864, the condition of
the interior of the prison was in such a state of disarray that complete
order could not be established. 49 The administration of Fort Sumter
was also inefficient, and many officers with overlapping authority
were in charge. Three independent officers had control of the region
around Anderson Station: Brigadier General John H. Winder, Col.
George Cooper Gibbs, and Lt. Col. Alexander W. Persons. Five officers
were over the guards. Captain Henry Wirz only had authority over the
actual stockade, and he could do little about the availability of supplies
because he had no authority to requisition them. 50 Surprisingly, the
federal government showed little interest in the persecution of anyone
besides Wirz after the war.
Wirz's Attempts to Alleviate Suffering at Andersonville
The problems Wirz faced were challenging from the beginning,
but he went to work with intelligence and energy. "Wirz was a constant
presence in Camp Sumter, and he worked tirelessly to improve its
conditions." The stream that went through the compound had become
an "open sewer," and the inmates used it as a latrine. The Swiss Captain
assigned men to shovel the filth from the stream daily, and he established
two dams along the creek, the higher dike for drinking water, the lower
for bathing. He wrote that the bread issued to the captives was "of such
inferior quality, consisting fully of one-sixth of husk, that it is almost
unfit for use and increasing dysentery and other bowel complaints," and
he recommended that the flour be sifted to remove such impurities. He
built a bake house, so more cooked food would be available, and he got
the prisoners to brew a crude beer made from corn mash and molasses
to control scurvy. Wirz also asked for more buckets because he did not
have enough of these items to issue more "rice, beans, vinegar, and
molasses" to the men. 51
49
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Andersonville Prison in 1864: the Dead Line is to the Right.
The Swiss guard continued his efforts to improve conditions,
and he "brought order to the chaos of the camp as commander of the
interior of the stockade in March 1864." Wirz established the "dead
line ," a boundary the captives could only cross at the risk of being shot
by the guards. The Captain "tried to compile accurate rolls," and he
made the distribution of rations more orderly by dividing the men into
detachments of 270 with a sergeant placed over each group. When the
men assembled for their rations each day, the sergeant was supposed to
account for each prisoner and "Failure to do so is severely punished."
To facilitate the distribution of rations , these detachments were further
divided into messes of 90 men each. 52
The commander at Andersonville also tried to deal with the
problems of overcrowding in the compound. "At his insistence the
original stockade was enlarged by ten acres" in June 1864. His overall
efforts were impressive, and the Swiss has received some acclaim for
his efforts. Lieutenant Colonel Persons was over the garrison troops at
Andersonville, and he gave his fellow Confederate officer just praise.
"Until the day of his arrest he was to exert every effort to alleviate the
52
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conditions within the camp and to stem the ever-rising death toll." 53
Even though he gave testimony for the prosecution at the trial, Persons
admitted, "I know he [Wirz] labored indefatigably" to help the prisoners,
most notably on trying to assure a clean water supply for the captives.54
The Lieutenant Colonel also maintained that Wirz could not be "blamed"
for the overcrowding in the prison, because the captives were sent there
by his superiors, and the defendant had nothing to do with that policy.55
As challenging as were the conditions at Andersonville, some
of the men who had experience with other Rebel prisons believed that
the circumstances of incarceration were more severe elsewhere. One of
the physicians who worked at Andersonville, John C. Bates, observed,
"Comparing the Macon [Georgia] prison with that at Andersonville, I would
prefer Andersonville at the time I was in it."56 A Union captive at the prison,
Herman A. Braun, agreed. "Many a prisoner who had given up the hope of
ever returning to the North, comforted himself with the nearer memories of
Andersonville, where his hunger had been appeased at least once a day." 57
Another Union prisoner, Edward Wellington Boate, held a
similar opinion. He had been incarcerated at Belle Isle just outside
of Richmond from October 1863 until February 1864, at which time
he was taken to Andersonville where be remained until August. "The
fare at Andersonville was about three times the quantity, both in meat
and meal, than it was at Belle island." He gave more details, "At Belle
island we got quarter rations-a quarter of a loaf of bread, with a small
bit of meat about that size (about five inches by three) .... My first
rations at Andersonville were about a pound of beef, salt and fresh and
two sanitary cups of meal. ... We got beans at the same time. We got
sweet potatoes the day of our arrival." Boate also claimed he heard a
conversation between Wirz and Joseph White, a doctor at the prison,
discussing why the death rates were higher among men arriving from
Belle Isle. According to Boate, "Dr. White had a theory, and he brought
facts to substantiate it, that they were the prisoners from Belle island who
suffered most; and it was apparent to all of us that such was the case." 58
53
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Burying the dead at Andersonville Prison.
Many of the problems were simply beyond the control of the Swiss
Captain because medical knowledge at the time was too limited to allow
for the proper treatment of sick men. Jim Downs , a medical historian ,
has observed that the federal government was equally inept during the
Civil War as disease spread through the refugee camps of freedmen.
"Physicians could not cure the fatal infections contracted nor could the
army of medical civilians that formed the Sanitary Commission prevent
the arresting spread of disease." 59 However, the Swiss commander 's
efforts at improving the quality of water and food likely saved thousands
of men at Andersonville who would have otherwise perished, and even his
most severe critics have been unable to state what else he could and should
have done to provide better for the captives and to save more lives .

Wirz's Attempts at Discipline
The Swiss commander was often harsh as he explained,
"Anybody who knows anything about military matters knows that one
in command of thirty-five thousand men has to be strict." 60 At his trial,
59
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60
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Wirz was condemned for the nature of the punishment he inflicted on
the prisoners. The Confederate Congress passed a law on April 13, 1863
stating that no soldier may be "punished by whipping, or the inflicting
of stripes upon his person." 6 1 No doubt, this legal protection clearly did
not ex tend to African Americans. There are a few accounts of men being
whipped at Andersonville, which seemed to be a punishment rarely
used . From the testimony at Wirz's trial, it is clear that very few white
men were given the lash, and most of the men who were flogged were
African American prisoners.
The relatively low status of these men probably contributed to
their relatively harsh punishments, and the Swiss commander likely
considered these soldiers to be in a different category because of their
ethnicity. He also seemed to demand more physical labor from them.
John Fisher, who was "colored," stated what Wirz did to him. "I was
bucked and gagged [tied up], and whipped with thirty-nine lashes"
because "I would not go to work." The prisoner testified that the strap
used to deliver the punishment was two and one-half feet long and "three
fingers" wide. While the use of such a device was clearly intended to
cause pain, such a wide whip was not designed to tear flesh as would
have been the case with a narrow, heavy cord. Fisher maintained that he
did not actually see any other men when they were being lashed, but he
saw three men, each an African American, after they had been flogged.
"They were not badly whipped; the blood was not drawn." 62
Some men were bucked and gagged, strung up by their
thumbs, or put on the "chain gang" where they were shackled to large
cannon balls often weighing thirty-two pounds. The most-frequently
reported disciplinary action was placing men in the stocks. This device
was simply a framework of wood with holes in them that allowed
the prisoner's feet or hands to be inserted which kept the man from
moving. 63 While the use of these devices was called "torture" when the
charges against Wirz was read at his trial, none of the men who gave
testimony as to their use and effectiveness used the word "torture." 64
61
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The greatest discomfort these men suffered was being restrained from
moving their limbs freely.
Nonetheless, the stocks were designed to be very unpleasant,
and the prisoners often complained that they were held in the stocks for
lengthy periods of time and denied adequate food and water. These harsh
punishments were most often in retaliation for escape attempts. Martin
E . Hogan was brought back after an escape attempt. "I was fastened at
the neck and ankles and left for 68 hours without food, except such as
was stolen to me by my paroled comrades." I. R. Achuff was caught
by dogs after he attempted to escape. "I was put in the stocks with my
hands fastened by a board and my hands stretched out, I was kept in
the hot broiling sun for 36 hours. I had nothing to eat, and but two
drinks of water." Thomas Adler said, "I knew of one man who was lying
senseless in the stocks for three hours before they would take him out."
But the man's ordeal lasted for a longer time because only the Swiss
commander could give the order to have him released. "He lay five
or six hours in the stocks until Captain Wirz came and they took him
out."6s
The lengthy times these men claimed they were held in the stocks,
including the 68 and 36 hours just mentioned, seemed to be challenging
to withstand, but such lengthy times might have been exaggerations.
Thomas N. Way stated that the terms of punishment were not as harsh as
they would seem because he was not held continuously in one position
in the stocks, and he was given breaks on a regular basis. "I was laid on
my back with my feet and arms in the stocks so that I could only move
my head . My face was right up upwards to the sun. I was four hours in
and one hour out during the 24 hours." 66

Union Punishments of its own Men
As harsh as these punishments were at Andersonville, the
punitive measure at the prison camp were not severe by the standards
of the age, and the Union Army often inflicted "brutal punishments"
on its own men that left some of them "permanently disabled." 67 As
the Union private , Frank Wilkeson, maintained, "The punishments
65
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inflicted on the enlisted men
were various, and some of
them were horribly brutal and
needlessly severe." 68
Perhaps wanting to
make a moral distinction
between the Union forces
and the slave owners in the
South who could legally whip
their human property, the US
Congress passed a statute
stating that the practice of
lashing soldiers would be
discontinued in the United
States Army. On August 5,
1861 Congress enacted, "That
flogging as a punishment in the
General George Armstrong Custer
Army, is hereby abolished." 69
Significantly, the law did not
prohibit the whipping of sail ors . Eve n though the floggi ng of so ldiers
was then illegal, the practice continued under some commanders durin g
the war and even after the conflict e nded . These officers had little to
fear from military courts, and lashing troopers was seldom, if ever, a
punishable offense.
General George A. Custer was an example of a commander who
continued to whip hi s men long after the practice was prohibited . At
the end of the war, Custer was se nt to Louisiana and Texas where his
army was poorly suppli ed, and hi s men started foraging for supplies and
taking what they wanted from c ivilians in the area. The "Boy General "
was concerned becau se hi s troops lacked discipline and were foraging
in defiance of orders not to do so. In General Orders No. 2, Custer
stated that be would forgo the required court martial heari ng for men
accused of plunder, and " It is hereby ordered that any enli sted man ...
committing depredations upon the persons or property of citizens, will
have bi s head shaved, and in additi on will receive twenty-ti ve lashes
8
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upon his back well laid on." Soon after, the general was called the "hero
of the lash." 70
Custer even bragged that his policy had been a success. "Since
my order-head-shaving and lashes-not flogging, discipline has been
restored." 71 In this comment, the general presented a classic example of
a distinction without a difference that made no sense. Twenty-five lashes
"well laid on" certainly was flogging. Some other officers found little to
object in Custer's policy. In fact, General James William Forsyth thought
he had been too lenient. "With reference to General Custer's order whilst
I was with the command, I have simply to say, that he made a great
mistake. Instead of whipping he should have shot [the soldiers] ." 72 Of
course, the victims of Custer's crimes believed differently. Curiously,
Federal officers could not legally flog their men for any reason, but they
could have them executed for various offenses.
The matter of whipping men to instill discipline came to a head
when Private Horace Cure of the First Iowa Cavalry was seized. He was
not charged with any crime, but he was "Arrested on suspicion only that
he knew the parties who had killed a beef." The man claimed he had
no knowledge of the incident, but this alone was cause for punishment.
As the surgeon of the unit, Charles H. Lothrop, reported: "Because he
would not or could not give information as to who the parties were he was
punished not because he assisted in killing the beef, but because he did not
know who killed it." The retribution for his lack of knowledge was that
"his head [was] shaved and he received twenty-five lashes, by command
of the author of the slave driver order [Custer] ." 73 In fact, Custer had
given an order that other men be punished at the same time. "To Captain
Davidson, commanding provost guard: You will at once shave the heads
and lash G. Darr, Company D, Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, and H. Cure, First
Iowa Cavalry, teamsters in Captain Lyon's train, and Gonsales of same
train." None of these men was given "Any trial whatever." 74
70
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Forms of punishment for Union soldiers.
The commander of the First Iowa Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander G . McQueen , was outraged at this treatment of one of his
men. McQueen was known as a "strict Presbyterian" who kept his
emotions under control, but the officer had sharp words for Custer
when he addressed the regiment. "Let Custer whip Cure if he dares . He
will then be the aggressor. But if General Custer attempts again to lay
violent hands on a First Iowa soldier, I will here say his hide will not
hold corn, by God!" 75 The phrase " not hold corn" probably meant that
Custer 's body would be perforated by cuts or bullets so many times that
it would not be able to hold any contents.
McQueen's anger led him to protest to Governor William H. Stone
of Iowa. Other officers complained to the Governor of Wisconsin, James
T. Lewis , and the matter came to the attention of the War Department
in Washington, DC. The Iowa State Legislature launched its own
investigation into the matter, and it criticized Custer heavily for his policy
of arbitrary, illegal , and severe punishments . The legislature reported that
the affair had been taken to Custer 's superior, General Philip Sheridan,
who ordered his subordinate to rescind the offensive order. Additionally,
Sheridan stated that an investigation should take place, but this order
75
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was only for show, and the legislative body believed "That no such an
investigation was ever had." 76 Only the official protests of army officers,
governors, and legislatures had brought sufficient attention to the crime
to warrant any action at all, but Custer escaped without an investigation
or even a simple reprimand for his crimes. Ironically, the nation that
virtually ignored the severe and illegal punishments of its own men
would soon condemn Wirz for lesser actions.
The Union Army's means of disciplining its soldiers was often
similar to the methods used by Wirz at Andersonville, but the federal
punishments were often more severe. As would be expected, Union
troops often viewed "military punishment . . . [as] the purest form of
despotism, the epitome of the class between soldiers, determined to
maintain their rights and individuality and officers equally determined
to enforce order and discipline." 77 Many forms of punishment were
based on common practice in the army, but many officers devised their
own forms of discipline. Some of the milder punishments included
the expulsion of the offender from the army, shaving a man's head, or
forcing him to wear a sign designating his crime. Other mild forms of
discipline were the withholding of pay and incarceration even though
the conditions of confinement could be challenging.78
More severe forms of punishment were designed to inflict
physical discomfort upon the victim . Making a trooper stand on a barrel
or to wear a barrel for hours on end was a common form of punishment.
Men were also forced to "ride the pole" or "ride the horse." In this
instance, the soldier was placed on a device similar to a saw horse and
forced to sit on a "Narrow rail, a soldier's entire body weight pressed
down on his legs or crotch, causing pain and discomfort as he sat there
for hours on end." Additionally, troopers had to carry weights in various
forms. Men were forced to participate in the "knapsack drill," which
meant they had to perform their regular duties wearing a pack that was
weighed down with rocks. Men also had to carry poles or logs of wood,
which could weigh up to seventy pounds. 79
Private Frank Wilkeson related how that punishment became
more burdensome as fatigue set in. He stated that such an object had
76
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the "Property of growing heavier and heavier as the sun rose higher and
higher. One morning at ten o ' clock I dropped a stick that did not weigh
more than twelve pounds at sunrise . . .. It had not grown but I was then
willing to swear that it had gained one hundred and eighty-eight pounds
in weight during the time I had carried it." 80
Union officers had their
men bound in various manners .
Some troops were just tied hand
and foot while others had chains
put about their necks. Among the
most feared punishments because
of the severe pain involved was
stringing men up by their thumbs,
and when victims were " bucked
and gagged." When a soldier
was strung up by his thumbs
much of his weight fell on the
thumb joints, and the pressure
"became excruciatingly painful."
Men were often strung up, so
Union soldier bucked and gagged.
their tiptoes barely touched the
ground. For hours, they had to stand on their toes to relieve the painful
pressure on their thumbs, and this activity added to their discomfort.
When a man was bucked and gagged, he was placed on the "Ground
with his legs bent so his knees were resting against his chest, a length
of wood placed under the knees, the soldier's arms wrapped around his
knees and tied to the stick, and something tied into his mouth to silence
him (often a bayonet)." The historian of discipline in the Union Army,
Steven J. Ramold, has called this punishment "horrendous." 8 1
Placing men in stocks was also a punishment used in the Union
Army. Branding was a punishment that was used largely in the first two
years of the war. The men were branded with a letter that designated
their crime, including D for deserter and T for thief. The troopers hated
this means of discipline. "Most soldiers viewed branding as the most
barbaric and degrading punishment possible." 82
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According to an eyewitness, Union Private Wilkeson, among
the most feared punishments was "Tying on the spare wheel." Often for
misconduct no more severe than being "insubordinate" or disobedient,
men were tied with their legs and arms wide apart on an extra wheel
often carried on an artillery wagon. They were left in that condition for
five or six hours. At times, the victim was given "a quarter turn" which
forced him into a horizontal position, and he had to use his entire strength
"to keep his weight from pulling heavily and cutting on the cords that
bound his upper arm and leg to the wheel." As Wilkeson stated, "I have
frequently seen men faint while undergoing this punishment." 83
Wilkeson identified "Another punishment which was much more
severe than the spare wheel, and which, because it was apt to cripple the
men physically, was rarely employed." This was know as "Tying on the
rack." Men were lashed upon the "rack," which was a board on a wagon
about an inch thick, in such a manner that the entire weight of his body was
placed on his chest. The punishment was so intense that "No man could
endure the supreme pain inflicted by this torture without screaming. I have
seen a strong and most determined man faint in less than ten minutes under
the strain of this severe and brutal punishment." Additionally, "I have heard
of men beg to be killed rather than to be tied to the rack." 84
The Union private gave an example of a man who would go
to great lengths to avoid being punished on the rack. Sergeant Stewart
got "wildly drunk." But "he had full control of himself physically, but
mentally he was a madman. He cursed loudly, and swaggered with
vehement gesticulation around the camp." Finally, an officer came out
of his tent and ordered, "Sergeant of the guard! ... Put a gag in Sergeant
Stewart's mouth, and then tie him to a spare wheel and give it a quarter
tum!" Stewart soon climbed a tree. The officer called to the sergeant to
come down and face his punishment, or "he would be killed." But the
drunken soldier would not come down and begged repeatedly that he be
killed rather than be tied to the wheel. He yelled, "You can kill me, but
you cannot tie me up." Stewart's wish was not granted, and he was tied
up after he came down. "When I left the camp of the regulars Stewart was
hanging on the wheel," as Wilkeson maintained, "And no one was paying
a particle of attention to Stewart's inarticulate cries and suffering." 85
83
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Wirz's Brutality
The most frequent abuse from Wirz was his infamous swearing,
and many unruly captives faced the Captain's profanity. W. D. Hammock,
a Union prisoner, admitted, "He [Wirz] was very profane, one of the
profanest men I ever saw. He had a very severe temper." When Martin E.
Hogan was captured and returned to the prison after an escape attempt, ·
he was subject to "Some of the most profane abuse from Captain Wirz
that I ever heard from the lips of man." 86 Augustus Moesner, also a
captive, gave an example of Wirz's cussing when the Swiss berated a
man for not following instructions, "God damn it! Couldn't you stay in
line where you were put?"87
Another Union captive, Solon Hyde, expressed a similar opinion.
"He [Wirz] was beyond controversy, the most intensely and abusively
profane man I ever met." Profanity meant more to Civil War soldiers
than swearing or cussing because it often involved the use of irreligious
expressions or contempt for sacred principals. Hyde gave examples of
the irreverent expressions the Swiss jailor used. "Py Schesus Christ,
shust so sure as I am going to hell!" Also, "Shust so sure as I vill never
get to heaven, I'll do so and so!" 88 Surprisingly by the standards and the
sensitivities of the early twenty-first century, Wirz's swearing and use
of profanity would seldom be viewed as severe.
In their memoirs and testimony at the trial, many Union prisoners
accused Wirz of brutality, stating that he needlessly shot men or beat
them to death. These accounts were often exaggerations or complete
fabrications, because these authors often stated what their audience in
the North wanted to believe. John McElroy wrote the most influential
narrative of life in the camp, which later formed the basis of MacKinlay
Kantor's popular novel Andersonville. McElroy defamed the Swiss
Captain throughout his book, and he stated that Wirz was guilty of many
crimes including "cruelly beating and murdering" captives. 89 However,
recent historians have denounced the memoir as "a prison novel," which
was "preposterously exaggerated." 90
86

Martin E. Hogan in The Trial of Henry Wirz, 768.
The Trial of Henry Wirz, 507 and 556.
88
Hyde, 328.
89
John McElroy, Andersonville: A Story of Rebel Military Prisons (Toledo: Locke,
1879) , 641.
90 Davis, Ghosts, 31 and Futch, 138.
87

November 2014 SAHS Review

36

Two prominent Civil War historians, James Randall and David
Donald, were equally doubtful of many of these autobiographies . "As
Dr. Hesseltine points out, the harrowing personal memoirs of prisoners,
which generally follow a set pattern, are to be taken cum grano salis
[with a grain of salt]; and the careful student will tend to agree with
him in rejecting the legend of willful Southern atrocities." 91 While the
majority of Union prison narratives condemned Wirz, some of the them
defended the Swiss, including James Madison Page, Herman A. Braun,
and Edward Wellington Boate. As Boate explained, "Wirz was as
kind-hearted a man as I ever met." At his trial, fifteen former prisoners
testified in Wirz's defense.92
Solon Hyde was a Union prisoner who had worked in the hospital
at Andersonville and knew Wirz personally, and the captive thought the
Swiss was condemned unfairly. Even though he failed to cite evidence
to support his accusation, Hyde placed the blame for the high death rates
at the prison camp on higher Confederate officials and not on the Swiss
jailor. "While Wirz was a man who could faithfully execute a piece of
work assigned to him, his was not the mind to plan such a scheme and
give it shape from chaos. Not at all. Wirz never planned Andersonville.
It was an idea conceived in Richmond, deliberately planned and
theoretically studied in all its probable details, in the council chambers
of Jefferson Davis at the Capital of the Confederacy." Hyde criticized
the trial which condemned the Swiss. "I ask any candid man, was it
right that Wirz should hang and they go free? It seems to me that Justice
herself might have dropped a tear over his grave, as she beheld the end
of that simple though too pliant tool in the hands of crafty workmen." 93

The Union Practice of Killing of Prisoners
Ordering men to execute prisoners of war is clearly an illegal
act and may rightly be considered as murder. If these accusations were
accurate, the act of ordering mens' deaths were clearly crimes, but other
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activities by the federal forces during the war would clearly fall into
this category as well. Throughout much of the war, the Union Army
had trouble dealing with the 43rd Battalion I st Virginia Cavalry under the
command of John Singleton Mosby, also known as the "Gray Ghost,"
which operated primarily in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. By late
summer 1864, the fight against Mosby and his men had taken an ugly
turn, and there were reports of the execution of prisoners by both sides.
In obvious frustration, General Grant ordered Major General Philip
Sheridan, then operating in the valley, to execute any of Mosby's men
when captured. "Where [when] any of Mosby's men are caught hang
them without trial." 94
Grant had given Sheridan a direct order to murder prisoners of
war. But Sheridan, also known as Little Phil because of his diminutive
size, did not wait for Grant's directive and had previously executed
captives. On the day Sheridan received Grant's order, Little Phil stated
he had already killed prisoners the day before. "We hung one and shot
six of his [Mosby's] men yesterday." 95
On April 24, 1863, the Lincoln administration formally issued
General Orders 100. Often known as the Lieber Code after its main
author, Franz Lieber, this body of rules attempted to codify the laws of
war used by the Union Armies. 96 While General Orders 100 were often
ignored in military practice, they had already clarified the legal status
of such executions. This code stated that men who fought "Without
commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile
army ... if captured, [these men] are not entitled to the privileges of
prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or
pirates." This punishment of immediate execution could be inflicted on
men believed to be "armed prowlers," "bandits," and "highway robbers
or pirates" as well. 97
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However, the Lieber Code gave special protection for men
considered as partisans. The code stated that "Partisans are soldiers
armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a corps
which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making
inroads into the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured they are
entitled to all the privileges of the prisoner of war." 98 Therefore, such
men as found in Mosby's command were protected from summary
execution.
In their memoirs, both Generals Sheridan and Grant referred
to Mosby and his men as partisans. Sheridan placed Mosby with his
list of "partisan chiefs," and Little Phil also included the followers of
the "Gray Ghost" as "partisans ." 99 General Grant added that "Mosby
had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment,
which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac." 100 Grant's
use of the term "regiment," and the use of the term "partisan," by both
Sherman and Grant meant that these generals had tacitly admitted that
the execution of Mosby's men was legally unjustified.
Among the most shameful instances of the federal forces
murdering prisoners of war under Mosby's command took place on
September 23, 1864. When the Rebel forces attempted to seize some
wagons, they were nearly surrounded by the Union cavalry, and the
Confederates were forced to fight their way out. In the ensuing skirmish,
only one federal soldier was wounded, Lieutenant Charles McMaster,
who was shot in the head. The badly injured man, who died three
weeks later, told his fellow countrymen that he had tried to surrender
to the Rebel cavalry but was shot anyway. In their desperate flight, it
was doubtful that any Southern trooper had time to taken him prisoner,
but McMaster's fate spurred his comrades to take revenge on the six
Confederate soldiers captured in the skirmish.
Probably also seeking revenge for other perceived atrocities
committed by their foes, the federals decided to execute their prisoners
even though there was no evidence that these captives were involved in
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any atrocities. While the Union leaders who actually ordered the slaying
of the first four men remains unclear because no one wanted to take
credit for such an illegal act, but General Custer was present, and he did
not protest killing these men. Custer liked to fight-and in this instancekill men to music, so he had his band play a dirge as these men were
taken to their places of execution. The first prisoners to die were David
L. Jones and the seventeen-year-old Lucien Love . They were shot to
death in the town lot of Front Royal, Virginia. Thomas E. Anderson was
married and had two children. He was soon also executed for crimes he
had not committed. 101
The next man to die was Henry Rhodes , who was also seventeenyears-old. He had attempted to join Mosby 's men as they rode through
Front Royal that very day, but his borrowed horse gave out, and he was
captured. When his widowed mother saw him being dragged through
town, she ran screaming to her son whom she hugged. All the time
pleading for his life , she followed the Union troopers to a field where a
federal soldier shot her only son to death . The poor woman almost went
crazy with grief and despair.
William Thomas Overby and a man only known as Carter
were the last Confederate prisoners to be executed that day. The Union
General, Alfred Torbert, interrogated the two troopers and offered them
their lives if they would divulge where Mosby's headquarters were
located. Neither man answered the enquiries, and Torbert ordered them
hanged. Before he was strung up, Overby called to the Union soldiers ,
"Mosby'll hang ten of you for every one of us." In a gesture that almost
invited retaliation, one of the Federal soldiers placed a sign on Overby's
body which read, "This will be the fate of Mosby and all his men." Soon
thereafter, another Confederate soldier was executed, bringing the total
to seven prisoners that the Union had killed.io 2
After launching his own investigation, Mosby was convinced
that Custer was responsible for the execution of his men, and the Gray
Ghost retaliated against some of the Boy General's men who had been
captured. Seven men were chosen by lot and condemned to death . Two
of these men managed to escape, and an additional two were wounded
by gunshots , but their executioners did such poor work that each of them
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survived . The three others were hanged. As Mosby explained, these
men received the extreme penalty in retaliation for Union crimes and
to keep such actions from recurring. His action was "to prevent the war
from degenerating into a massacre ." Mosby promised General Sheridan
that the Gray Ghost would not kill any other Union prisoners unless
the federals killed captives first. This essentially ended the matter and
executions for revenge by both sides were stopped in the Shenandoah
at that time. 103 As in all cases of Union atrocities during the war, the
murder of prisoners of war were never investigated and the perpetrators
were never punished.

Question of Wirz's Ability to Beat Men
In the opinion of three physicians who gave testimony at the
trial, Wirz's wounds and illness left him incapable of committing many
of the crimes ascribed to him. Dr. G. G. Roy worked with Wirz starting
in September 1864, and he said that the Swiss had a "gangrenous ulcer"
on his right hand . The doctor stated, "I should not think he would be
able, in any way, to strike a man down with anything in the hand of that
arm ." He added, "I think he could not with that arm or hand grapple or
shake any one." 104
Dr. C. M. Ford described Wirz's right arm, "It is swollen and
inflamed, ulcerated in three places; and it has appearance of having
been broken. In addition to that, I believe that portions of both bones
of the arm are dead ." Ford continued , "I should think him incapable of
knocking a man, or lifting a very heavy instrument of any kind, without
doing great injury to the arm." Referring to Wirz's left arm, the doctor
stated, "There is a very large scar on the left shoulder, and ... the
deltoid [shoulder] muscle is entirely gone ... only the front part of the
muscle of the shoulder remaining." Ford also testified that Wirz had
"dark brown scars" on his legs from scurvy. The physician added the
Swiss could not "exert himself to do any act of violence, because in
doing that he would be very apt to do injury to himself." Dr. John C.
Bates agreed with the other physicians about the Swiss being unable to
use his arms to hurt anyone . The doctor referred to his examination of
Wirz's legs and added, "There is, it seems to me , an intermingling of the
103
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scorbutic [scurvy] and syphilitic taint." 105 The doctors also pointed out
that Wirz was sick and absent from his post at Andersonville throughout
August and most of September 1864 and was not present when the
crimes ascribed to him were supposedly committed.

The System of Prisoner Exchange Breaks Down
Jefferson Davis attempted to place all the blame for the deaths
of prisoners of war on the Union. "The real cause of all the protracted
sufferings of prisoners, North and South, is directly due to the inhuman
refusal of the federal government to exchange prisoners of war." 106
While this single explanation is too simple because a number of factors
were at play in the high death rates, Davis addressed a serious problem.
The United States had the opportunity to alleviate the suffering of the
Union prisoners and to save many lives by sending aid or by exchanging
prisoners, but the federal government refused to do so and then tried
to place the blame on the Confederacy. As explained by William B.
Hesseltine, the esteemed historian of the prisoners of war in the conflict,
"Official propaganda was undertaken to convince the North that exchange
was impossible-that it had been stopped by the South-and that the
southerners were actuated by a determination to destroy the lives of the
prisoners in their hands." 107
Late in 1863 General
Benjamin Butler was chosen as
the Union commissioner for the
exchange of prisoners . As the
general explained , "I had been
appointed to the command of
the Department of Virginia
and North Carolina Nov.
2 , 1863 , and subsequently
commissioner for the exchange
of prisoners." 108 Butler was a
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questionable choice if the Union was seriously attempting to exchange
prisoners, but he was the perfect choice if the federals were trying to
block the release of captives. Jefferson Davis had already branded Butler
as a criminal, meaning that Confederate officials should have nothing to
do with him because of his crimes in New Orleans. 109
Upon the capture of New Orleans, which was completed on
May 1, 1862, Benjamin Butler was made military governor of the city.
The general wanted to quell any resistance to the Federal occupation
of the city, and he soon became known for his harsh treatment of its
inhabitants. Before the city was completely taken by the Union, seven
inhabitants of the city tore down a Union flag. They were arrested,
subsequently tried for treason, and found guilty of that crime. Butler
paroled six of them, but he thought that he had to make a statement
about federal authority in the city, and refused to show mercy to William
A. Mumford. 110
When Butler set the date of Mumford's execution as June 7,
1862, many people believed that the punishment for such a minor crime
was so excessive that they refused to believe that the general would
be so cruel as to carry it out. Butler pushed aside the numerous death
threats, stating that the execution would leave him in less danger than
allowing the condemned man to live . "I thought I should be in the
utmost danger if I did not have him executed, for the question was now
to be determined whether I commanded the city or whether the mob
commanded it."
Surprisingly, Butler met with several persons who begged that
the Mumford's life be spared, including the condemned man 's wife
and children. "Mrs. Mumford in a proper way began to intercede for
her husband and the father of her children. She wept bitterly, as did
the children, who fell about my knees" pleading for their father's life .
But Butler was not moved to pity and he ordered the execution to take
place, and Mumford was hanged on the appointed day. 111 Apparently,
the General later had a twinge of conscience. When Mrs. Mumford
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came to see him after the war stating that she had fallen on hard times
financially and asking him for help, he was instrumental in securing her
suitable employment in Washington, DC. 112
Many Southerners believed Butler's rule in New Orleans had
been harsh, and they also considered the execution of Mumford to be
inexcusable. Many Confederates reacted to the news with indignation,
often referring to the general as "Beast Butler." In retaliation for the
execution of Mumford, Jefferson Davis stated in a "Proclamation" of
Dec. 23, 1862 that the condemned man had been "executed in cold blood
by hanging." Not only was this "deliberate murder," but there had also
been "numerous outrages and atrocities" committed by the Union forces
under the Union general. Davis stated I "do pronounce and declare the
said Benjamin B. Butler to be a felon, deserving of capital punishment."
He further announced that Butler was "an outlaw and common enemy
of mankind, and that in the event of his capture the officer in command
of the capturing force do cause him to be immediately executing by
hanging." 113
Additionally, Jefferson Davis unwisely used the stopping of
the repatriation of prisoners of war as a means of coercion against the
Union. "I do further order that no commissioned officer of the United
States, taken captive, shall be released on parole, before exchange, until
the said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crime." 114
If Davis actually thought that the federals would put General Butler to
death or hand him over to the South for execution to secure the release
of Union officers, he was deluding himself. No government in war
time-or even in times of peace for that matter-could ever be expected
to execute one of its own leaders or to hand that person over for capital
punishment to a hostile nation.
The President of the Confederacy also outlined what he
considered to be "repeated atrocities and outrages" perpetrated on
New Orleans and the South. He was particularly incensed by Abraham
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation that was scheduled to take effect
on January 1, 1863,just a little over a week after Davis's "Proclamation"
of Dec. 23, 1862. Lincoln's pronouncement freed no slaves immediately,
112
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but the decree would liberate persons held in servitude as the Union
forces advanced further into the Confederacy. Significantly, the federal
president's decree also stated that the United States would actively
recruit African Americans into the federal forces. As Lincoln declared,
"[Former slaves] will be received into the armed service of the United
States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man
vessels of all sorts in the said service." 115
Moreover, Jefferson Davis equated the use of African
Americans in the conflict as causing "servile war-a war in its nature
far exceeding the horrors and most merciless atrocities of savages." He
added that Lincoln's "public and official declarations signified ... his
approval of the effort to excite servile war within the Confederacy."
The prospect of a major slave uprising had long been a great fear in
the South. President Davis retaliated against General Butler's actions
and Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation by declaring that all the
"commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be
declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable
warfare, but as robbers and criminals deserving death! And that they,
and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution."
Also, "That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered
over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which
they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States."
Davis extended his condemnation to the Union officers serving with
African American troops. "That the like orders [reserved for capital
punishment] be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned
officers of the United States when found serving in company with said
slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of
this Confederacy." 116
While his "Proclamation" may have given the impression that
the Confederate president was doing all he could to resist emancipation
and the harsh measures of Union troops occupying the South, his decree
did little to change federal policies. Soon after, on April 24, 1863, the
Lincoln administration issued General Orders 100, which formed
the basis of Union military law for the remainder of the war. These
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regulations included a denunciation of condemning an enemy to death
without a trial. "The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an
individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a subject of the
hostile government an outlaw, who may be slain without trial by any
captor." 11 7
President Davi s had gone too far in retaliation against the North
and to punish the Union for its actions and policies . By refu sing to
parole officers (released until exchanged) until Ge neral Butler had been
executed, in effect, the Confederate president had turned prisoners of
war into bargaining chips, and hi s threat to stop pri so ner exchanges in
retaliation meant that the Federals would be tempted to use the release
of captives as a matter of repri sal as well. Unwittingly, Dav is had given
the Union either a reason or an excuse to stop the exchange of prisoners ,
and this policy had a devastating impact on the condition of captives
held at Andersonville because they were to be subject to hash conditions
that could have been alleviated if they had been returned to the North.
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General
Ulysses Grant

Union Refusal to Exchange Prisoners
Because the Confederate agents could not deal with a Union
criminal, Butler's appointment as an agent of prisoner exchange was
a ploy by the United States government to hurt the possibility of
exchanging captives and make it look like the South's fault. Butler
overcame some of these problems , and he negotiated with Confederate
officials who were naively still trying to exchange prisoners. LieutenantGeneral Grant frustrated these efforts, saying such transactions would
aid the Confederacy more than the Union. 11 8
Benjamin Butler first met Grant on April 1, 1864 , and the
commander of all Union armies gave his subordinate details on why
the exchange of prisoners was a bad idea. While Grant would allow
118
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the exchange of sick and wounded men to continue, he stated that
no healthy men should be exchanged until he gave his personal
permission. 119 General Grant wrote to Butler on April 14, 1864,
stating again that no prisoner exchanges were to be made without
his specific approval. "Your report respecting negotiations with
Commissioner Ould for exchange of prisoners of war has been
referred to me for my orders. Until examined by me, and my orders
thereon are received by you , decline all further negotiations." 120
General Grant's opinion had not changed four months later in August
when he wrote directly to William H. Seward, the Secretary of State
in the Lincoln administration, stating, "We ought not to make a
single exchange nor release a prisoner on any pretext whatever until
the war closes." 121
Grant later expressed some sympathy for Union troops held in
captivity under trying circumstances, but he stated that a policy which
blocked prisoner exchanges would do much good for the men still in
combat units. He also maintained that his strategy would save the Union
from defeat and surprisingly be a potential blessing to the South as well
by saving them from destruction and annihilation. "It is hard on our
men held in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity
to those left in the ranks to fight out battles. Every man we hold, when
released on parole or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at
once either directly or indirectly. If we commence a system of exchange
which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the
whole South is exterminated. If we hold those caught they amount
to no more than dead men . At this particular time to release all rebel
prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat [in the Western Theater
of operations] and would compromise our safety here [in the Eastern
Theater] ." 122
The head of all Union armies also stated that in prisoner
exchanges, the Union did not receive men fit for duty, while the South
got able-bodied men who went immediately into the Confederate army.
According to federal practice, these troopers returned from captivity were
given a furlough of three months to recuperate at home , but Grant stated
119
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that few of these men actually returned to the ranks. 123 He expressed a
similar opinion when writing to William H. Seward. "Exchanges simply
re-enforce the enemy at once, whilst we do not get the benefit of those
received for two or three months and lose the majority entirely." 124
General Grant's claims need to be carefully examined. Within
the same conversation with Butler, the commander of Union armies
addressed the issue of exchanging wounded and sick men. He then
stated that such exchanges would bring men who were physically sound
to the Confederacy and disabled men to the Union. If Grant maintained
that the wounded can be treated differently, then it stands to reason
that he could make sure that only healthy troopers be exchanged for fit
soldiers or only physically impaired men be exchanged for unfit troops.
Also, as commander of all Union armies, Grant was in a position to alter
any federal practice. He could have demanded only physically fit Union
men be exchanged, and he could have changed policy to place these
men directly back in combat units.
The Union general's arguments only have merit if he believed
that the Confederate soldiers were superior, man for man, to Union
troops because prisoner exchange would have brought an equal number
of men to the federal army. Besides, the Confederate soldiers in Union
prisons were usually in a deplorable physical condition, and many could
not hope to join again in military campaigns until after a lengthy period
of recuperation often at their homes. By 1864 the Union was occupying
many areas of the Confederacy, and many released prisoners would
actually return to their homes behind federal lines. These men would be
out of reach of the Confederate authorities, and little could be done to
compel these men to return to their units. Clearly, many of them would
have elected to stay home rather than risk their lives for a cause that was
clearly failing by the fall of 1864.
No doubt, Grant planned to use his numerical superiority to
the greatest advantage against Lee's army in the upcoming Overland
Campaign which took place in May and June 1864, and the Union
general wanted the Confederates to receive no significant increase
in strength. Specifically, Grant stated that the Union held twenty-six
thousand Southern prisoners, "And if they were exchanged it would give

123

124

Butler, 592-3.
Grant to Stanton Aug. 21, 1864 in OR Series 2, vol. 7: 662.

Henry Wirz and the Trag edy of Andersonville . . .

49

the Confederates a corps, larger than any in Lee's army, of disciplined
veterans better able to stand the hardships of a campaign and more
capable than any other." 125 But Grant's numbers were misleading. The
Union did have roughly 26,000 Confederate prisoners early in 1864, but
the South only held about 13 ,000 Federal prisoners. 126 This meant that a
man-for-man exchange would bring only 13 ,000 men to each side, and
that an equal number of Confederate prisoners would still be held by the
North, their fate to be decided at some future date.
General Grant was quite correct in this numerical assessment
of how the increase in troops in the Confederate army could alter the
balance of the size of armies, but he likely exaggerated the overall impact
of this alteration. At that point in the war, the Army of Northern Virginia
under the command of Robert E. Lee had approximately 64,000 men.
These soldiers were divided into various units including three infantry
corps which included roughly 10,000 in the First Corps, 17 ,000 in the
Second Corps, and 22,000 in the Third Corps. 127 An increase of 13,000
men to Lee's army clearly equaled adding another small infantry corps
to the Confederate army, but it would not be a large corps as Grant had
feared. The Amy of the Potomac numbered about 117 ,000 men at that
time, 128 and an increase of 13,000 men would have also given the Union
the equivalent of an additional corps.
Additionally, Grant's supposition that the increase in numbers in
the Confederate army potentially hurt the relative strength of the Union
army is also exaggerated. If Grant insisted that only healthy men be
exchanged, which he clearly could have done, he then would have also
received 13,000 able men. While a man-for-man exchange apparently
would have benefitted both sides equally because the numbers of men
would have been the same, the relative size of the armies would have
changed under this agreement. Adding 13 ,000 men to each side meant
that the total strength of the Confederate army would have increased
to 77,000 men and the federal to 130,000. Before such an exchange,
125
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the Southern army was 54.7% the size of the Union army, and after
the exchange the Confederate forces would have been 59.2% as large
as their federal counterpart. This was a relative increase of only 4.5%.
Since Grant failed to defeat Lee's army in the Overland Campaign in
May and June of 1864 even though his adversaries were little more
than one half the strength of the Union forces, any change of the ratio
in favor of the Confederacy could have made victory less likely, but
the impact of such a small change in ratio could also have been largely
insignificant.
Another important issue was the question of whether the
Confederates could have properly supported the additional manpower
in their ranks. The South had great difficulties in supplying Lee's army
under the best of circumstances, and the troopers often lacked such
articles as clothing and shoes to the point where they were often forced
to rob dead soldiers on the battlefield for the needed equipment. Also,
the Confederacy had difficulty in feeding its men throughout the war,
a problem that was only enhanced in the later stages of the conflict in
1864 and 1865. As the historian, Gerald F. Linderman, has observed,
"Several analysts have concluded that too many Southerners became
soldiers, to the detriment of the Confederacy's ability to sustain its
armies in the field." 129 The addition of many more men could have
presented an insurmountable problem in supplying them properly. If
this was the case, the effectiveness of a large number of troops returned
in an exchange to Lee's army could have been severely compromised.
Relative Combat Efficiency and Prisoner Exchange

The relative worth of the Confederate and Union soldiers
exchanged would have also had an impact on the ability of both sides
while on campaigns. Grant believed that the southern troops would
have a larger impact that their numbers would seem to indicate because
he had an inflated assessment of these men's fighting ability. He stated
that these troopers were "disciplined veterans better able to stand the
hardships of a campaign and more capable than any other" soldiersY0
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Union soldiers
The veracity of Grant's supposition on the superior quality of
Confederate troops remains highly uncertain. The question has been
subject to debate, and northern soldiers have even given the nod to
their adversaries in both marksmanship and tactics. For example, after
the Union victory at the Battle of Cedar Creek on October 19, 1864, a
federal officer, John William De Forest stated, "As I have said before,
they [the Confederates] were obviously the best shots, and their openorder style of fighting was an economical one. Moreover, when they
retreated, they went in a swarm and at full speed, thus presenting a poor
mark for musketry. We, on the contrary, sought to retire in regular order,
and suffered heavily for it." 13 1
On the other hand , experts on the war have rated the fighting
ability of the opposing troopers as about equal. In the conclusion to
his classic studies entitled the Life of Billy Reb and the Life of Billy
Yank, the eminent Civil War historian , Bell Irvin Wiley, maintained,
13 1
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"on the basis of the whole war record it cannot be said that the common
soldier of one side was any better or any worse fighter than the one who
opposed him." 132
Other attempts have been made to address the relative
effectiveness or the "fighting value" or "efficiency" of combat forces
of the belligerent armies during the Civil War. Professors Herman
Hattaway and Archer Jones have even rated the relative performance of
Confederate and Union combat troops based on a mathematical model
oftheir success in inflicting casualties on the other side. These historians
conclude that "the fighting value of Confederate armies far exceeded
that of the Union," but their reasoning for this opinion did not rest with
the superior fighting ability of the southern soldier. "The most likely
explanation is not that one Reb could beat ten Yanks but that the Union
system of forming new regiments did great harm to combat efficiency
as did their practice of discharging veterans whose terms of service had
expired." 133
Hattaway and Jones have presented perhaps the most important
argument on the relative effectiveness of combat units on both sides
during the Civil War. The South simply used a superior method of
conscription and retention of combat troops relative to the inferior
system used by the North. Many Confederate units were formed in the
spring and summer of 1861, and the troopers were enlisted for one year.
Before these soldiers served out their terms of service, the Confederate
Congress extended the time of their enlistment for an additional three
years or until the end of the war. The southern government also instituted
the draft in April 1862 to force additional men into service. 134 According
to these new terms of recruitment, the men who joined could choose into
which units they were placed, but all men went into existing organized
bodies of soldiers. This policy had the effect of keeping up the fighting
strength of veteran units because the new recruits learned their craft
very rapidly from their fellow soldiers. Also, the Confederate practice
132
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of placing new recruits into existing units paid big dividends in the size
and continued combat effectiveness of its forces.
A good example of keeping units up to strength was the famous
Stonewall Brigade. Organized as Virginia's First Brigade in April 1861,
the unit soon won fame at the First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) on
July 21, 1861, when it held off repeated attacks by Union forces. It
was commonly called the Stonewall Brigade afterwards. The force
initially numbered 2,600 men, but it suffered many losses due to illness,
desertion, and casualties from heavy campaigning in its first year of
its existence. Yet when new recruits came to the unit after the draft
law of April 1862, the brigade swelled to 3,681 men by the end of the
month, and this was the largest size it ever reached. 135 Presumably, it
also attained its greatest battle effectiveness at the same time.
The contrast between the continued combat effectiveness of
Confederate units and diminishing abilities of Union forces was a major
factor relating to the abilities of the competing armies. The historian,
Gerald F. Linderman, has stated succinctly, "Northern states funneled
new men into the war by forming new units." He pointed out that this
was the case in almost every Union state except one. "Wisconsin alone
strove to keep its original regiments filled." 136
The federal government recruited troops largely by appealing to
the various states still in the Union to create combat units. Once formed,
these new forces had the usual learning curve before they attained their
peak performance. Almost at the same time such factors as desertion,
illness, and casualties ate into the size of these units, and their numbers
and combat effectiveness began to decline . After even a few campaigns,
the ability of these military compliments often started to deteriorate.
Frequently, these units became a mere shadow of their former selves
and were much less useful against the enemy later in the war.
The medical historian, Paul E. Steiner, has presented estimates
on how rapidly Union units would degrade during the war. The "halflife" of a regiment, by which its numbers declined to one half of its initial
strength, "Depended somewhat on its location and combat experience,
but even without action it was only about a year. Unless recruits
were added, regiments tended to disappear by being discontinued or
135 James I. Robertson, Jr., The Stonewall Brigade (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State,
University Press, 1963), 82.
136
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consolidated after about three years." 137 Bruce Catton presented more
negative estimates of the decline in unit strength in the conflict. "The
Civil War regiment had a paper [original] strength of one thousand men;
the regiment that could bring as many as five hundred to the field, was
very lucky, and the average strength of a veteran regiment would usually
be between two and three hundred." 138
The Union soldier, Frank Wilkeson, presented an even more
negative appraisal of the decline in manpower during the war. By the
"Winter of 1863-64 ... The ranks of the original volunteers, the men
who sprang to arms at the tap of the northern war-drum, had been shot
to pieces. Entire platoons had disappeared. Regiments that had entered
the great camps of instruction formed around Washington in 1861-62 a
thousand men strong, had melted before the heat of Confederate battlefire till they numbered three hundred, two hundred, and as low as one
hundred and fifty men." 139
The history of the Union's famous Irish Brigade demonstrates
this point. This force was formally organized on September 4, 1861, and
it initially numbered over 3,600 men. After winning great praise for its
performance in such actions as the Seven Day's Battles from June 25 to
July 1, 1862, the Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg) on September 17, 1862,
and the Battle of Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862, the numbers of
men fell dramatically. The federal government refused to recruit more
men into the unit, and by the end of December 1862, the organization
only mustered five hundred men. In little more than fifteen months,
one of the most-respected brigades in the Union army had dramatically
declined in numbers and effectiveness. It was then no larger than an
undermanned regiment. After the Battle of Gettysburg July 1-3, 1863,
it had only three hundred men remaining, and its numbers continued to
decline for the remainder of the war. 140
The highly-respected Second Corps of the Union army was
another example of an impressive unit that was "fought out and used
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up." This "most famous corps in the army" had taken the Bloody Lane
at the Battle of Antietam in 1862, had suffered over four thousand
casualties at the Battle of Fredericksburg in 1862 while maintaining
its combat efficiency, had repul sed Picket's Charge at the Battle of
Gettysburg in 1863, and had stormed the Bloody Angle at the Battle
of Spotsylvania in May 1864. 141 Yet after those achievements, the
corps proved to be largely ineffective.
At the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road in June 21-23, 1864 , the
Second Corps 's performance was shameful when it went into combat
on June 22. A report from the "Second Army Corps" shortly after
the battle described the poor conduct of the unit. "The abandonment
of the line by brigades and regiments without orders and without
firing a shot, and the surrender to the enemy of entire regiments by
their commanders without resi stance was disgraceful and admits of
no defense." 142 The man who wrote the report, Francis A. Walker,
later became the historian for the Second Corps, and he was equally
critical of its conduct at Jerusalem Plank Road many years later.
"The Second Corps had been defeated almost without being engaged.
There had been very little fighting, and comparatively small loss,
except in prisoners." In this brief engagement, the corps had lost
1,700 men as captives to the enemy. That was "more than it had
[lost as prisoners] at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville
combined." 143
The problems with recruitment and terms of enlistment plagued
the Lincoln administration from the beginning of the war. The Union
initially recruited men to serve for ninety days in the spring of 1861.
This time of service was absurdly impractical because men in the
ranks for such a brief period of time could attain little effectiveness,
and much of the army would di ssolve in three months. The ninetyday recruits proved to be ineffectual as demonstrated by their poor
performance at the First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas) on July 21,
1861. The Union commander in the battle, Irvin McDowell, lamented
the shameful conduct of his men at the end of the engagement as his
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army literally fell apart. "The retreat [of federal forces] soon became a
rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic." 144
The federal government changed the terms of enlistment and
then recruited men to serve for three years. However, the Union never
fully resolved the issue of short enlistment periods, and many men were
recruited for various lengths of service throughout the war. From time
to time enlistments were for 3 years, 9 months, 6 months or 1, 2, or 3
years . Even in April 1864 late in the war, men were recruited for only
100 days. 145
These various lengths of service meant that many Union troops
were often lacking in training and experience, and able soldiers and
effective units were being mustered out of service at various times
throughout the war. A good example is the 2nct Vermont Brigade comprised
of the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Vermont infantry regiments, which
was organized on October 27 , 1862 to serve for nine months. These
men were largely involved in garrison duty until they participated in the
Battle of Gettysburg. 146
In one of the most significant engagements of the war, these
troopers faced the might of Picket's Charge on July 3, 1863. These
units, most notably the 13th and 16'h regiments, distinguished themselves
by disrupting the flank of the attacking columns and weakened the
Confederate advance. 147 Of the 4,834 men who served in the brigade,
only 68 had been killed in battle , and two regiments, the 12'h and 15 1h,
had suffered no combat fatalities at all. Most men were lost to death by
disease or to early discharges due to disability, and the total losses for
all reasons were approximately 700. This meant that 4,134 men were
still present and available for duty after nine months of service. 148 The
2nct Vermont Brigade was almost completely intact and had shown itself
to be one of the most effective fighting units in the Union Army, but
it was disbanded between July 14 and August 10, 1863 and made no
further contribution to the war effort.
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The Union method of recruitment has also been criticized
for bringing unsuitable men into the service. When the United States
Congress passed the Enrollment Act in March 1863, the federal
draft was created. Under the strictures of the law, men could avoid
conscription if they could claim various exemptions .149 They could also
pay a substitute to take their place, or they could pay an exemption fee
of $300 to avoid service entirely. Depending on where a man joined, he
could receive cash payments or bounties from local, state, and federal
agencies. These bonuses could amount to more than $1000, a huge sum
at the time, and some potential recruits expanded their payments by
illegal means. These "bounty men" would often join from one area,
desert, and then enlist somewhere else under an assumed name, thus
increasing the amount of money they received and without any service
in the army. 150 One bounty jumper who was about to be executed by
firing squad confessed "to being a professional bounty-jumper, worth at
the moment near twenty thousand dollars, the proceeds of his work in
jumping sixteen bounties." 151
The eminent Civil War historian, Bruce Catton, has severely
criticized this system of bringing men into the military. Most of the
"men who had joined up only because they got a great deal of money for
doing it, and in the great majority of cases these men were worse than
useless." He added further, "in camp they were valueless, and early in
1864 the army command stipulated that no bounty men could be used
on picket or outpost duty" obviously for fear that these men would use
these relatively isolated locations as an opportunity to slip away. These
men had to be watched. "The mere business of guarding them to see that
they did not desert or plunder their honest comrades took time and effort
that should have been used in other ways." Catton also maintained that,
"In battle they were a positive handicap. Under no circumstances could
they be induced to fight." 152
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The Union soldier, Frank Wilkeson, had an equally negative
assessment of these men who only joined to collect the bounty. "With
large bounties came a different class of recruits, the bounty jumpers.
These men had to be heartlessly moulded into soldiers." Additionally,
"It is also true that no earthly power could change the character of their
hearts; and they were essentially cowardly." They were also discipline
problems. "The bounty-jumpers would cheerfully engage in savage
rows; they would fight fiercely with their fists, but they could not and
did not stand battle-fire stanchly." 153
The men who were enlisted for three years starting in 1861
were scheduled to be released from duty in 1864, and the Union had to
find a way to keep these troopers in uniform. The Confederates passed
laws to keep their men in the service, but the federal government gave
their soldiers the option of going home or reenlisting. Retaining these
experienced veterans was key in maintaining combat efficiency in the
Union army. Bruce Catton states, perhaps with some exaggeration, that
if these troopers left the service, the men who replaced them would be
inadequate to their tasks because "conscripts and bounty men could not
make Robert E. Lee's incomparable soldiers even pause to take a deep
breath." 154
Restricted by its own policy of not bringing new men into
established units, the federal government simply had to get these troops
to reenlist, and the men were offered bounties as incentives to sign
up again. These state and federal bounties added up to about $700.
Additionally, the men were given recruiting speeches which appealed to
their patriotism and willingness to see the war through to its end. There
always seemed to be plenty of whisky available for the men at these
rallies. However, the most effective inducement to reenlist was the offer
of a thirty-day furlough. Many men, who had not seen their homes in
more than two years, were pleased to accept this respite from the tedium
of military service. 155
This thirty or thirty-five days' furlough was an important
inducement to get the men to reenlist. The terms of their service would
be over in the summer of 1864, but the men were usually offered
furloughs six months in advance of that date. Many soldiers, who had
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learned to survive one day at a time rather than be concerned about the
distant future, found the furloughs too tempting to resist.
Captain Brewer Smith of the Sherman Brigade (named for
United States Senator John Sherman of Ohio) expressed how many men
welcomed the leave time. "The boys made up their minds to take three
years more of hell for the sake of thirty days of heaven-home [italics in
the original] ." 156 But the bitter reality of continued military service hit
these men when they returned to their units. One Union soldier, George
W. Bicknell, commented on the disposition of the men when they
returned from the furlough. "There was sorrow on many a poorfellow's
face as he reflected that he had rebound himself and that possibly he
had seen his home for the last time. The entire camp seemed gloomy for
days after the reenlisted had returned." 157
General Sherman thought that inducing the veteran troops to
enrol again in the army was a very good idea, but he criticized the
timing of this effort because it inhibited his abilities at a crucial juncture
in the Meridian Campaign of February 1864. "About this time we were
much embarrassed by a general order of the war Department, promising
a thirty-days furlough to all soldiers who would "veteranize"-viz.,
reenlist for the rest of the war." He thought "this was a judicious and
wise measure, because it doubtless secured the serviced of a very large
portion of the men who had almost completed a three-year enlistment, and
were therefore veteran soldiers in feeling and habit." Nevertheless, "to
furlough so many of our men at that instant of time was like disbanding
an army in the very midst of battle." 158 Fortunately for Sherman, he was
able to continue with his campaign despite the men who were then on
leave.
As already argued, General Grant stated in August of 1864 that
"If we commence a system of exchange which liberates all prisoners
taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated." 159
The commander of all Union armies was unclear in what he meant
by the idea of the "whole South is [will be] exterminated." He could
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have meant the eradication of all the Confederate armies, the complete
physical destruction of the South, or both. Of course, Grant, as
commander of all Union forces in 1864 and 1865, had much to say
about the conduct of the federal forces late in the war, and he chose to
wage destructive campaigns that targeted the property and possessions
of southern civilians. The effectiveness of this policy was overrated,
including General Sherman's burning of Atlanta and the subsequent
wastage of much of Georgia. The Confederate army facing Sherman
had withdrawn weeks before, and the destruction of Georgia gave the
Union no military advantages. Rather, it was an example of unnecessary
brutality, and the federal policy of destruction, clearly supported and
fostered by Grant, was not forced on him by military necessity. It was
his choice, and he could have decided upon other policies. 160
Grant's belief that prisoner exchanges helped the South more
than the North overlooked a number of issues, including the problems
ofrecruiting soldiers and Union morale. Many people in the North wrote
to Lincoln begging him to send relief to the prisoners or to exchange
them. 161 General Sherman wrote that he received many requests to free
captives, "I get one hundred letters a day almost asking me to effect
the exchange or release of these Prisoners." 162 Men who risked their
lives in battle wanted their government to do everything possible for
them if they were captured, and many of the soldiers and their families
felt betrayed by the refusal to exchange them. Some of these directed
their anger at President Lincoln. William Keys, a Union captive at
Andersonville, wrote in August 1864, "Father Abraham [Lincoln] I
wish you had my ration of wood to boil coffee for your family, I think
you would soon bring on an exchange." Another soldier at the prison
stated, "If the government don't get us out they may go to the Devil with
Abraham Lincoln." 163
On July 20, 1864, the prisoners at Andersonville wrote a
petition to their government requesting their exchange. Wirz released
a six-man commission of Union soldiers led by Edward Wellington
160
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Boate to carry the petition to
the North. As Boate recorded,
"It distresses me to state
that the representatives of
thirty-eight thousand Union
prisoners were treated with
silent contempt, the President
[Lincoln] declining to see
them or have anything to do
with them!!!" [italics in the
original] The Union soldier
further stated that the policy
not to exchange prisoners
was the "quintessence of
inhumanity, a disgrace to the
Administration that carried
it out, and a blot upon the
country . . . . You abandoned
Robert Ould
your brave men in the hour
of their cruelest need. They fought for the Union, and you reached no
hand out to save the old faithful, loyal, and devoted servants of the
country." 164
Robert Ould, the Confederate commissioner over prisoner
exchange, proposed on January 23, 1864 that each side send their
own doctors to oversee the captives held by the enemy and "shall be
permitted to take charge of their health and comfort . .. with power to
receive and distribute such contributions of money, food and clothing
and medicines as may be forwarded for the relief of the prisoners." 165
This proposal gave the Union the opportunity to care for their own men
in Confederate prisons, but the offer was ignored.
General Sherman's Georgia campaign gave the Union an
opportunity to aid or release captives in Confederate prisons. After
General George Stoneman's raid of July 26-31, 1864 failed to release
prisoners, Sherman took little further interest in the captives. Even
when he marched virtually unopposed across Georgia in November
and December 1864 and into South and North Carolina the following
164
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year, he made no attempt to release or bring aid to the Union prisoners
nearby. Late in November of that year, Union cavalry forces under
General Hugh Kilpatrick were in Macon, Georgia, which is about sixty
miles from Andersonville on modern roads. On its advance to the Little
Bighorn in 1876, the 71h Cavalry marched approximately sixty miles
in the first forty-eight hours. 166 The federal cavalry in 1864 could have
marched that distance in the same amount of time or less to help the
captives in the prison, but no such attempt was made.
As the scholar, Robert S. Davis, has observed, "Before the
year [1865] ended, the United States government tried Wirz for war
crimes and hanged him. General Sherman, more responsible than Wirz
for prisoners remaining at Andersonville, however, received a hero's
welcome in Washington and a full military review." Additionally, "He
[Sherman] abandoned them [the prisoners] to their terrible fate." 167
The federal prisoners held in the South had every right to expect their
government to come to their aid by any means possible, and the refusal
of the North to take advantage of any opportunity to help them was
inexcusable.
In September 1864, Confederate officials began to remove the
captives at Andersonville to other locations. Finally in February 1865
with the war coming to its end, Grant stated that he would exchange
"about 3000 prisoners per week." 168 In April of that year, Wirz was
sending about one thousand men per day to the Union lines, and only
a few men remained in captivity in May. The last recorded deaths at
Andersonville took place on May 4, 1865. Fearing no legal retribution
for his conduct, Wirz remained at his headquarters, but the victorious
Union sought revenge for the deaths in the prisons and wanted someone
to blame and to punish. General Winder was the logical person to try
for crimes , because he had command of Union prisoners in the South,
but he had died of natural causes on February 7, 1865, and could not be
prosecuted. 169 But Wirz was accessible, and he was arrested on May 7
and brought to trial in Washington, D .C., starting on August 21, 1865.
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A Prejudiced Court
The trial of Henry Wirz started
when the Judge Advocate General
of the United States, Joseph
Holt, selected a "special military
commission" of nine senior army
officers, including seven generals
and two colonels to oversee
the court proceedings and pass
judgment on the guilt or innocense
of the defendant. Colonel Norton
P. Chipman was the prosecuting
attorney or "judge advocate" of
Norton P. Chipman.
the proceedings. Many of the nine
Courtesy: Library of Congress.
officers on the commission had
personal grievances against the Confederacy. Eight of them had served
in battle during the Civil War. Three of these men had been wounded
in that conflict, and one of these, Francis Fessenden , lost hi s ri ght leg
to damage received in battle. Another member of the commission, John
White Geary, lost his so n, Edward, in combat with the Confederacy.
Fessenden was also awaiting a promotion from the rank of brigadier
general to that of a major general during the trial. His father, William
Pitt Fessenden, wrote to hi s son that the promotion would be granted at
the end of the legal proceedings. The older man was correct, and Francis
was advanced to that rank nine days after Wirz's execution. Clearly,
the younger Fessenden knew that hi s advancement in rank depended at
least partially on how well he performed in the trial. 170
Only three members of the tribunal had been lawyers before the
war, so most of the men on th e commission had no formal legal training.
Only one, General Lew Wallace , the famous author of Ben Hur: A Tale
of the Christ, had served on a military commission before. 17 1 Wallace
was the president of the commission to try Wirz, and he probably hated
the Swiss long before the trial began. The general's prejudice against
the defendant was made evident the first time Wallace laid eyes on the
110 Gayla M. Koe11ing, "The Trial of Henry Wirz and Nineteenth Century Military
Law," (Ph.D. Dissertation , Kent State Un iversity, 1995) , 73-84.
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him. The president of the
tribunal described the Wirz
as having an evil demeanor
like a depraved animal. In a
letter to his wife on August
21, 1865, the general wrote
that Wirz had "eyes large ..
. very restless, and a peculiar
transparency . . . reminding
you of a cat's ... excited by the
scent of prey; in the manner he
is nervous and fully alarmed,
avoids your gaze, and withers
under the knit-brows of the
crowd. His complexfon is
ashen, bloodless, almost blue,
General Lew Wallace.
altogether he is well-chosen
172
Courtesy: Library of Congress.
for his awful duty !" Wallace
probably meant that Wirz's
"duty," was to kill Union prisoners , and the president of the commission
would do nothing to favor of the Swiss during the trial.
This military tribunal, staffed with prejudiced officers and having
been established to try a man for crimes against soldiers in the U.S.
Army, could hardly be considered impartial. Rather, these men could
be expected to have vested personal and profession interests in finding
Wirz guilty in a spirit of revenge, self promotion, and to vindicate
federal military policies. 173
General Wallace had recently been in a similar position in
which he could influence the outcome of an important trial when he
served on the commission to try those accused of involvement in the
conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln and other high government
officials. In fact, Wallace probably owed his appointment as the head
of the tribunal to try Wirz to the general's conduct at the trial of the
charged conspirators in Lincoln's murder. The defendants at the trial
172

Lew Wallace to Susan Wallace Aug . 21 , 1865 a cited in Koerting, 152.
Important biographies of Wallace include, Robert Morsberger, Lew Wallace:
Militant Romantic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980) and Iving McKee, "Ben-Hur" Wallace: the Life of General Lew Wallace (Berkeley: U of California, 1947).
173

Henry Wirz and the Tragedy of Andersonville ...

65

of Lincoln 's assassins included
Mary Surratt , who was charged
with cooperating in the planning
of the murders. The case against
Surratt was largely circumstantial.
The conspirators had met in her
boarding hou se in Washington, D .
C., where they hatched their plot,
and one of her sons, John Surratt
Jr. , was involved in the plans of
assass ination . Mary mi ght have been
guilty of nothing more than holding
Southern sympathies and being in
the wrong place at the wrong time .
Mary Surratt .
Clearly, she was not involved in
Courtesy: Library of Co ng ress .
any ac tion against any government
leader, but she was found guilty of conspiracy and treaso n. As a result
of the trial, four men were given pri sons se ntences. One died in 1867 ,
and the others were pardoned by Pres ident Andrew John so n in 1869 . On
July 7 , 1865 , Mary Surratt was han ged with three other defendants . 174
Women were rarely exec uted in the United States at that time
out of deference to their gender, and Surratt's death was the first case of
capital punishment meted out on a woman by the federal government.
The fact that she was Catholic likely worked against her , and she
garni shed less sy mpathy than would have bee n the case otherwise
because many Americans feared her much-maligned religion. 175 The
questionable case against Surratt , in which Wallace concurred with
the guilty verdict, showed that the ge neral would have few qualm s
about condemning Wirz in another trial also on the basis of large ly
debatable evidence. Wall ace nev er expressed regret for those trial s,
and he maintained the ju stice of the verdicts his entire life . 176
174
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After reviewing the evidence of the trials of Surratt and Wirz,
S . W. Ashe commented , "In the fall of 1865, .. . there took place in
Washington City two judicial murders, which will ever stain the annals
of the conquering States-that of Mrs. Surratt, hung for complicity in
the assassination of Lincoln, and that of Henry Wirz, also done to
death, after a mockery of a trial , for alleged ill treatment of prisoners
under his care at Andersonville." 177
The issue of religion again hurt Henry Wirz, also a Catholic,
when his trial began a little more than a month after Surratt's execution.
The United States was mostly a nation of Protestant churches at that
time, and these religions had a natural antipathy against Catholicism
because they justified breaking away from that faith during the
Protestant Reformation due to its supposed evils . This prejudice was
enhanced when many poor Catholic immigrants from Germany and
Ireland came to the United States during the 1840s and 1850s, often
raising crime rates and competing with native-born Americans for jobs.
The movement against these immigrants was so strong that Millard
Fillmore, the candidate from the anti-foreigner and anti-Catholic
American Party, gained over twenty-one percent of the popular vote
in the 1856 presidential election. 178 The fact that Henry Wirz was a
Catholic and an immigrant with a German accent made him a much
more likely target of prejudice.
The Union press had reported so many sufferings of soldiers at
the Andersonville and other prisons during the Civil War, which clearly
enraged public opinion, that a fair trial for Wirz was nearly impossible
anywhere in the North, and the court showed little pretense of impartiality.
The court was a military commission , meaning the proceedings were
on questionable constitutional grounds because civilian carts were in
operation at the time, and military courts were unnecessary. The United
States Constitution also states, "The trial of all crimes ... shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed," meaning that the proceedings had to be a
jury trial and had to take place in Georgia. (Article 3, Sec. 2, para. 3)
The Fifth Amendment adds that the trial of a "capital" or "infamous
177
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crime" is illegal "unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury." No such jury met.
The Trial of Henry Wirz Begins
The trial started in a curious fashion on August 21, 1865. The
prosecution began the case by reading the charges, and Wirz pled
not guilty. When the court reassembled the following day, the judge
advocate, Norton Chipman, received a package from the United States
Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, under whose authority all military
trials took place. Stanton ordered the court to be dissolved, and Chipman
was commanded to report immediately to the War Department. As
Chipman later stated, Secretary Stanton was soon in a "towering rage
at the coupling of [Jefferson] Davis' name and that of General Lee and
other high rebel functionaries with this awful crime." As a result, "I was
ordered to prepare new charges leaving out the name of Davis, Lee,
[James] Seddon [Confederate States Secretary of War], and others in the
Davis' Cabinet and proceed only against Wirz." 179
The judge advocate was miffed by Stanton's insistence on
excluding the higher officials. Chipman admitted that convicting "Wirz,
which was of comparatively small consequence and the work only of
a few days" would accomplish little in bringing the most important
leaders of the Confederacy to trail. Stanton and Chipman reached
a compromise by including lesser men in the indictment who were
more closely associated with the operations of the prison. These two
government officials also agreed to include the terms "other's unknown"
in the charges and with "that form of pleading submit all the evidence
touching upon the alleged conspiracy" to kill Union soldiers. 180
While Wirz was the man in court to be tried for his life, the
reading of the "charges and specifications" in the proceedings included
a number of other persons. The first charge stated that the Swiss was
guilty of "combining, confederating, and conspiring together with John
H. Winder, Richard B. Winder, Joseph [Isaiah H.] White, W. S. Winder,
R. R. Stevenson, and others unknown to injure the health and destroy
the lives of soldiers in the military service of the United States, then
179
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being held and being prisoners of war." The specifications of the charge
were a long list of supposed crimes stating that Wirz had conspired with
Confederate officials to kill Union prisoners, "by subjecting [them] to
torture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome
quarters ... by compelling the use of impure water and by furnishing
insufficient and unwholesome food." As a result "many of them, to wit,
the number of ten thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and
died by reason thereof, which he, the said Henry Wirz, then and there
well knew and intended." 181
In a trial noted for exaggerations, it was surprising that the
"number of ten thousand" men who died at Andersonville was given
because it was too low an estimate. Also, the names of the men who
died at the prison were known because the Confederate officials kept
extensive records, but these inaccuracies had little bearing on the
nature of the charges. The criminal aspect of these specifications was
the contention that these unhealthy conditions, and the resulting high
mortality rates at Andersonville, were deliberately established with
malicious intent to do harm and could have been easily prevented or
remedied.
The specifications included anumberof other estimates, including
that the guards had followed orders "maliciously and needlessly given
by said Wirz, that said prison-guard did fire upon and kill a large number
of said prisoners, to wit the number of about three hundred." This total
was severely exaggerated. No doubt men were killed by guards, but the
tally of victims was much smaller. The Confederate jailers recorded
the name, unit, and cause of death for 12,367 Union soldiers who died
at Andersonville, and these materials were published shortly after the
war. An examination of this tally has revealed that only two men were
listed as dying after they were "shot by the guard." These men were
H. Lohmeyer from Ohio "died Nov. 30 [1864)" and S. Connor from
Pennsylvania "died Jan 1, '65 ." 182
Curiously, John H. Winder had died in February 1865, and
implicating him in the accusation made no sense legally. He could
not testify, and he could not explain his actions, justify his policies,
or provide an adequate defense. However, such a condemnation could
181
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help influence public opinion that the supposed crimes against prisoners
of war by the Confederacy was part of some kind of wide-spread
conspiracy. John H. Winder's son, Richard Bayly Winder, was in federal
custody during Wirz's trial. In fact, the younger Winder was being held
in the Old Capitol Prison in Washington, D. C., as was the Swiss, and
the two were in adjoining rooms. If both these men were guilty of the
crime neglecting inmates at Andersonville, they could have been tried
together, but this was not done. Joseph White and R.R. Stevenson were
physicians at Andersonville, and they also were not tried with Wirz.
The accusation against "others unknown" was very vague. 183 Clearly,
the prosecution was attempting to place suspicion on any number of
possible suspects that could include many Confederate officials in some
kind of vast conspiracy to kill Union prisoners of war. In fact, these
charged offenses were so broad that virtually no one could be definitely
excluded as accomplices in the crimes.
The second charge in the indictment included thirteen specific
accusations of "Murder, in violation of the laws and customs of war,"
for which Wirz was personally responsible. Supposedly, he had either
murdered these men himself or had given direct orders to others to have
them killed. In his "statement," which was his personal defense at the
end to the trial, Wirz gave an adequate summation of the murder charges
against him that included: "No less than thirteen distinct crimes" of
murder. "Three by shooting with my own hand [specifications 1, 3, and
4], one by jumping and stamping upon a prisoner [specification 2], three
by torturing prisoners in stocks and chain-gang [specifications 5, 6, and
7], four by ordering sentries to fire upon prisoners [specification 8, 9,
10, and 12], one by having a soldier torn to pieces [specification 11],
and one by beating a soldier with a revolver [specification 13] ." 184
In every case, the name of each victim was "unknown," but
the approximate dates of some of the incidents were given. The four
accusations of Wirz ordering men to shoot captives are examples of
how the charges read. In the four charges, Wirz was accused of ordering
Confederate soldiers to shoot prisoners. In each case, the wording
was almost identical. The Swiss "feloniously and of his malice of
aforethought did order a rebel soldier, whose name is unknown, then
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Over the Deadline by Lew Wallace.
Courtesy : Lew Wallace Study and Museum .

on duty as a sentinel or guard to the prison of which said Wirz was
commandant as aforesaid, to fire upon a soldier belonging to the army
of the United States, ... whose name is unknown, and in pursuance of
said order so as aforesaid and murderously given as aforesaid, he, rebel
soldier, did ... fire at the said soldier ... inflicting upon him a mortal
wound ... of which he, the said prisoner, soon thereafter, to wit, on the
day aforesaid, died." 185
185
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Such a vague phraseology and imprecise accusations clearly
give the impression that these charges were based on questionable or
unreliable evidence. As the defense would argue later in the trial, some
of the supposed crimes took place when Wirz was away from the prison,
and one crime involved a violent assault which the ailing Swiss was
certainly physically incapable of administering. 186
After the reading of the second indictment, Wirz's lawyers,
James Hughes and Charles W. Peck, requested a "postponement of the
case in order to enable the accused to prepare for his defense." The
request seemed reasonable because the second indictment presented
accusations that had been altered from the first indictment, and the
attorneys for the defense said they needed a few more days to prepare
their case to address the altered charges. After a deliberation, the court
gave them only until the following day, August 24, at noon to enter a
plea for their client. When General Wallace called for an adjournment,
Hughes, who was visibly irate, stormed out of the courtroom. 187
Perceiving that their defense of the defendant would be hampered
by the biased court, Hughes and Peck withdrew from the case. Hughes
later wrote to Wirz to explain the reason for abandoning the accused's
defense. The lawyer condemned the proceedings and stated that the
court was a sham. He directed much of his criticisms at Chipman for
"arbitrary and disgraceful acts of power, without regard to law, justice
or fairness." Hughes further stated that there was an "undignified
cooperation" between the judge advocate and Wallace which would
make the defense most difficult. 188 The lawyer clearly believed that the
prosecution and the trial commission were cooperating with each other
to find the defendant guilty.
The withdrawal of Hughes and Peck briefly left Chipman in an
awkward position. In a curious aspect of accepted procedure at military
trials at the time, the prosecuting officer had to serve as counsel for the
defense if the accused was not represented by lawyers. Since no defense
attorneys were then serving for Wirz, the judge advocate would have to
preside both for the prosecution and for the defense. This potentially
cumbersome and embarrassing situation was resolved the following
day when Louis Schade and Otis H. Baker came forward to serve as
186
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defense counsel for the accused. They immediately entered a plea for
Wirz stating that he was innocent of all charges. 189
The reasons why Schade and Baker decided to serve as Wirz's
attorneys remain unclear. They worked for free, and the two men had little
to gain in reputation from defending a much-maligned and unpopular
client, especially in the face of a hostile court clearly bent on finding
him guilty. Schade was born in Germany, and his name ironically had a
number of gloomy meanings including: "what a shame," "too bad," and
"how sad." While the two men probably worked together to prepare the
defense, Baker handled almost all of the day-to-day activities in court,
and Schade spoke rarely during the proceedings, most notably when his
colleague was absent the morning of October 3, 1865. At that time, the
German just requested that the court wait until his associate returned
before it continued. 190
The actual work of the trial began on August 24, 1865, after
Schade and Baker had been admitted as defense attorneys for Wirz.
The two lawyers immediately entered a series of pleas contending that
the trial was on insecure legal grounds, and that the defendant should
go free. The court also had no legal jurisdiction over the defendant, as
Wirz's lawyers argued, because of the surrender terms of Confederate
General Joseph E. Johnston to Union General Sherman on April 26,
1865. This agreement specified that all men under Johnston's command,
including troops in Georgia, "will be permitted to return to their homes
not to be disturbed by the United States authorities." Technically, a
pardon had been granted to all these men including Wirz. 191
The trial was also on shaky legal grounds because it was run by
a military commission, "being a tribunal unauthorized by either statue,
military law, martial law, or well-established usage." Additionally, Wirz
was "a naturalized citizen of the United States; that he is not, and never
has been, in the land or naval forces of the United States," and no U.S.
military court had jurisdiction over him. Also, the Civil War was over,
so a state of war could not be used as an excuse to place military courts
over civilians. This meant "that no military jurisdiction or authority
incident to a state of war alone can rightfully detain, try, or punish
189
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him." As a common citizen, the defendant had the right to a civilian
trial by jury comprised of his peers rather than by a military tribunal
which could skirt the normal procedures of jurisprudence, including the
rights of the defendant. In addition, the defense maintained that none
of the charges amounted to "any offense punishable under the laws of
war."192
Another plea from the defense related to the issue of "double
jeopardy" or trying a defendant twice for the same crime, which was
forbidden in Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Schade and
Baker maintained that the actual trial had begun on August 21, 1865,
when the first set of charges were read and when Wirz had entered his
plea of not guilty. The fact that Secretary of War Stanton stopped the
trial and ordered the judge advocate, Chipman, to change the nature of
the charges, meant that a second trial began on August 23. Therefore, the
prosecuting officer had botched his attempt at proving his case against
the defendant, and Wirz should go free.
Chipman countered all these arguments stating that the court had
legal jurisdiction, the pardon issued by Sherman when the Confederate
armies under Johnston had surrendered did not apply to Wirz, and that
the false start of the trial on August 21 did not mean that the defendant
had already been tried. Then "the court was cleared for deliberation; and
when the doors were reopened, the decision of the court was announced,
sustaining the motion of the judge advocate." 193
Unreliable Testimony
At the trial of Henry Wirz, the prosecution, headed by Norton
P. Chipman, used the vast financial and legal resources of the federal
government to prosecute the case. As judge advocate, Chipman had
much power over the court proceedings and how evidence could be
presented, and he "controlled who was summoned as witnesses for
both the prosecution and the defense." This meant that "Chipman could
refuse to let the defense subpoena important ex-Confederates who could
testify in Wirz's behalf." 194 Not only could he give the prosecution an
unfair advantage in the proceedings, but he could also inhibit Wirz's
192
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lawyers from making an adequate defense. As Dr. Gayla M. Koerting has
summarized: "The inability to summon witnesses decisively hindered
the defense's performance during the tribunal proceedings." 195 The first
witnesses testified on August 24 and the last on October 24, 1865. In
those two months a total of 143 persons gave statements, 109 strictly
for the prosecution but only 18 strictly for the defense. Approximately
16 others were either called for the prosecution and later recalled for the
defense or the reverse, meaning they had been called for defense and
had been recalled for the prosecution. 196
Clearly, the huge volume of the testimony presented against
Wirz was meant to give the impression that the case against him was
overwhelming, as though the trial could be decided by the weight of
attestation alone while obscuring the question of its accuracy. Also,
much of the evidence presented in the proceedings was repetitive in
nature and often did little more than rehash earlier statements without
substantially advancing the case against the defendant.
From the outset, the military tribunal favored the prosecution,
a situation that became more apparent as the trial proceeded. When
the counsel for the defense, Baker, objected to some aspect of the trial
or to the nature of the proceedings, the court overruled him the vast
majority of times, while Chipman's objections were almost always
sustained. In an apparent act of generosity, the government paid the
traveling, lodging, and food expenses for the witnesses. They were also
paid three dollars per day, which was a handsome sum at the time. As a
point of comparison, privates in the Union Army during the Civil War
were only paid thirteen dollars each month, and this came to only fortythree cents per day. 197 This much remuneration could lead witnesses
to believe that they had to earn their pay. As Koerting explains, "This
was a considerable amount of money during the time period and could
easily persuade many to say something damaging against the former
commandant." 198
Many of the witnesses for the prosecution were unreliable,
including Thomas C. Alcoke. This Union soldier testified on August
28, 1865, that he "saw" Wirz shoot a man dead with only the slightest
195
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provocation. The witness further gave descriptions of the defendant and
his weapons. But when he was asked to show the location of the shooting
incident on a map of the prison compound, Alcoke admitted that he had
impaired eyesight: "I am almost blind and cannot show it to you on the
diagram." He also indicated that he had little idea when the incident
took place. "This occurred in February, I think: February [ 1865] or June
[ 1864] or along in there. I cannot say for certain in what month it was."
He later admitted: "I don't know what month it was; it was very hot
weather, real summer weather." The "hot" weather indicated that the
month could not have been February, but the highly unreliable witness
could not be sure. 199
On the same day, Boston Corbett, already famous for having
killed Lincoln's assassin, John Wilkes Booth, gave vague statements
on prisoners being shot in the compound. "I often, very often, heard
the report of a musket. I knew by what was said that a man was shot,
but I did not see it." Baker immediately criticized such testimony, and
he "objected to the witness stating anything which he did not see." The
witness explained: "It was too dark to see it, but I heard the whistle
of the balls, and know that they fired into the stockade without any
provocation whatever." Corbett never explained how he knew what had
happened, and he presented no evidence on why the shots were fired.
Also, few men could hear the sound of a musket ball fly through the air
even at a close distance, and his statements were clearly exaggerations
or fabrications. 200
Baker again "objected to the witness stating anything but what
he knew himself." General Wallace, as president of the court, put the
defense counsel in his place and set the policy of allowing hearsay
evidence for the remainder of the trial. "The witness may state what he
heard among the prisoners at the time these killings took place , what the
prisoners said and what the sentinels said, by whose orders the firing
was done, etc. The court wants to hear it all." 201
The permissive nature of what testimony was allowed meant that
many unreliable witnesses who testified at the trial spun questionable
evidence out of rumors circulating in the prison. Some of the witnesses
clearly perjured themselves and many more severely exaggerated . As
199
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the historian, William Marvel, has explained, the trial record "runs
heavy with some of the most absurd hearsay that any American judge
ever permitted to stand." 202
On the same day that General Wallace stated that hearsay
testimony would be accepted in the trial, both attorneys for the defense,
Baker and Schade, withdrew from the case. Baker complained that "I
do not think that I can be of any assistance to this prisoner by remaining
on the case any longer." When he tried to explain further by saying, "I
had hoped that with the mass of testimony which I have in his favor ..
. ,"Wallace cut him off and demanded to know if both he and Schade
were leaving the case . They affirmed that they were, and the president
of the tribunal did not allow them to make any statement. Wallace then
observed: "Very well; the judge advocates will take care of rights of the
prisoner." Baker and Schade probably hoped to bring more fairness to
the trial the only way they could , by resigning in protest, but Wallace
refused to change the procedures of the court. The ploy by the two
lawyers left Wirz again in the hands of Chipman to defend him, and the
prosecuting attorney was clearly bent on his destruction. In desperation,
Wirz pleaded with Baker and Schade to return. On the following day,
August 29, these two lawyers entered the courtroom with the accused,
were readmitted as his counsel, and continued to work for his defense.
Numerous witnesses for the prosecution stated that they heard
the Confederate guards claim that they got furloughs for thirty days
when they shot a Union prisoner. The charge was serious, but no official
document was found in the prison to support this accusation, and it
might have been a complete fabrication .203 Also, none of the Confederate
soldiers who testified at the trial confirmed that there was a policy of
giving furloughs to troopers for shooting inmates at the prison.
At least twenty witnesses stated in court that Confederate
soldiers, including the Swiss commander, robbed them of their "private
possessions" when they entered the Andersonville stockade.204 No doubt,
the implication was that these captives had the means of buying needed
articles from the guards or local citizens, including food, tools, clothing,
and medicines, and the lack of funds contributed to their misery. One
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witness, Thomas C. Alcoke, gave the exact amount of money taken
from him stating that Wirz "took from me a belt with $150 in gold, and
the balance in greenbacks, amounting to $280 altogether." 205
Alcoke never explained how he kept such a huge sum of
cash from being stolen before he got to the prison, and the reports of
Confederate soldiers stealing money and goods from Union prisoners
at Andersonville lack credibility. Troops from both sides of the conflict
were routinely robbed of anything of value when taken captive. This
was such a common practice that men expected to lose their possessions
at the very point when they were made prisoners , and many Rebel
guards had numerous opportunities to search Union prisoners before
they got to Georgia. Throughout the war, Confederate soldiers were
almost always in need of food, equipment, and clothing, and these men
logically would be prone to taking what they needed. However, the
Union troops routinely robbed the Confederates as well. A Rebel trooper,
John W. Munson, gave an account of losing almost everything he had
when captured. "The baubles and splendors of guerilla life disappeared.
They got my hat and plumes, my gloves and pistols, my watch and
belt, and all my personal belongings. Before I had time to make the
slightest protest, one fellow sat me down abruptly, put his foot on me,
and relieved me of my boots in a most startling and finished manner. ..
. The Yankees trimmed me well." 206
The witnesses for the prosecution described the conditions of
Andersonville, the treatment of prisoners, and Wirz's supposed crimes
in similar manners. They could have just followed the leading questions
from the judge advocate, but there are other possibilities . While they
waited their turns to testify, these attestors could have read accounts of
the trial in newspapers or attended earlier sessions in court by sitting
in the visitors' gallery. This information could have influenced the
witnesses to understand what was expected of them and to say much the
same . They could have also been coached or intimidated to give certain
accounts or to slant their testimony.
When the court reconvened on Monday, September 11, 1865,
Baker stated that many of the witnesses he hoped would come to the trial
had not arrived arguing that "these witnesses were absolutely necessary
205
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for the prisoner, in order to enable him to make out his defence [sic],
which he believed he could do thoroughly, if proper facilities should be
afforded him." Baker further added that many witnesses who came for
the defense had been manipulated or intimidated. The defense counsel
wanted to "call the attention of the court to the fact that many witnesses
who have come, subpoenaed for us, have been examined on the part
of the government, and sometimes witnesses have complained that
improper language has been used to them to draw out of them something
for the prosecution." Baker added, "Witnesses come here under very
peculiar circumstances. Many of them feel it to be necessary to say and
do all that they can to leave a favorable impression with the government
officers to show their friendship or good feeling to the government."
According to the lawyer, some witnesses were intimidated and feared
that they might be liable for some kind of retaliation from the federal
government. They often told him , "Why, do you suppose I will leave
anything undone to save my own head?" 207
Chipman responded by asking Baker ifhe had any formal charges
to be brought against the judge advocate and insisted that the defense
counsel statements had been highly improper. The judge advocate
maintained: "Speaking for my associate and myself, I pronounce such
a charge entirely false." He added that "the preliminary examinations
on the part of the government have been made with all the fairness and
courtesy due from any attorney or judge advocate toward any witness."
Wallace , as president of the tribunal , jumped in to have his turn at
Wirz's lawyer, demanding that he "state the names of the witnesses."
Baker admitted, "That I cannot tell. When a witness catches me by the
arm and speaks to me on the street or elsewhere, how can I know his
name?" General Wallace then dismissed Baker's observation unless
names could be presented. "The only object in asking the names of the
witnesses is that an investigation may be had and any guilty parties
punished ." 208 Colonel Chipman and General Wallace had effectively
sidelined the question of federal officials tampering with those giving
testimony.
Witnesses for the prosecution included Confederate officers
in the prison system. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Persons
commanded the 55'h Georgia volunteers who served as guards at the
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prison. He outranked Wirz and should have born more responsibility
for the conditions at Andersonville than did a mere captain. But Persons
had been clearly offered a deal for his testimony. He would not face
persecution if he accused Wirz. 209
The federal government gave some of the witnesses rewards,
apparently for giving their testimony properly. A man identifying
himself as Felix De La Baume took the stand on September 12, 1865.
Much of his testimony was similar to that presented by others, but he
stated that he had seen Wirz shoot two prisoners just for leaving a line
of men. "First I heard a shot fired, without seeing who fired it. After
hearing that shot fired I looked down to the left and I saw Captain Wirz
fire two more shots, wounding two men." The witness added that "I have
seen many men on the battle-field in the same condition [as the men
Wirz shot], and they always died shortly afterwards." 210 On October 19
before Wirz's trial was over, De La Baume was rewarded for his good
work with an appointment to the Department of the Interior.
Despite his moving testimony, De La Baume was far from a
credible witness. In fact, he was a charlatan. He had claimed that he
was born in France near the Rhine River and that he as a grand nephew
of the Marquis de Lafayette, a much-respected leader in the American
War of Independence. But his career as an employee for the federal
government ended on November 19 after some of the men from his old
unit in the Union Army recognized him. His real name was Felix Oeser,
he came from Saxony, which was far away from the Rhine, and he had
deserted from the army. 211
Benjamin B. Dykes took the stand for the prosecution
on Septmeber 21. He had been "employed as a railroad agent at
Andersonville," and he gave testimony on the supply situation in the
compound. He said that there were sufficient rations for the men in
captivity, and there were "a good many vegetables raised" nearby in
1864, but the prisoners were not allowed to purchase any even when they
had funds to do so. Dykes probably feared that the federal government
could charge him for performing illegal activities for the Confederacy
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during the war if he did not cooperate sufficiently. Apparently, his
performance on the stand was acceptable, and he soon went to the War
Department for his reward, which was a full pardon.2 12
Colonel Chipman only allowed testimony within certain
limits, and he did his best to keep the defense counsel from presenting
evidence that would besmirch the reputation of any high government
official. When Baker stated that a petition from the Union captives at
Andersonville requesting a prisoner exchange had been brought to the
"President or Secretary of War," who ignored their request, the judge
advocate objected vehemently. "The proposition of the counsel is to
prove, in this unheard-of way, a fact which can scarcely be believed of
a man whose name and fame are so unstained and so unimpeachable as
that of President Lincoln .... This court must not allow a slander of that
kind against the memory of so great and good man as President Lincoln
to be repeated by this witness who has no knowledge of the facts." Lew
Wallace soon sustained this objection. 2 13
Chipman and Wallace certainly saw Lincoln as above reproach
and as someone who could not be touched or criticized in any manner.
As the eminent Lincoln scholar, David Donald , has observed, "the
Lincoln cult is almost an American religion." This movement was well
underway within hours of the president's death, especially by Republican
politicians who recognized they had much to gain from eulogizing the
martyred leader of their party.214 The judge advocate wanted the trial
to be a clear condemnation of the Confederacy, and he tried to make
sure that nothing would be presented in court to question any person or
policy of the federal government.
The testimony against Wirz tended to be vague. The victims
of his supposed attacks remained nameless , and the accounts of acts
against them were often confusing. Only in a couple of instances was the
evidence specific enough to include the name of the victim and to allow
for close examination. On September 22, 1865 , George W. Gray said
he saw Wirz shoot a man "named William Stewart, a private belonging
to the 91h Minnesota infantry." After Gray and Stewart removed a dead
212
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boy from the stockade, "Captain Wirz rode up to us and asked by what
authority we were out there or what we were doing there. Stewart
said we were there by proper authority. Wirz said no more, but drew a
revolver and shot the man." Once the victim was dead, the commander
robbed the corpse. "After he [Stewart] was killed the guard took from
the body about twenty or thirty dollars, and Wirz took the money from
the guard and rode off, telling the guard to take me to prison." 215
The evidence was so specific and technically so essential to
the prosecution that Chipman "called upon the prisoner to stand up for
identification." Wirz was sick throughout the trial, and he had trouble
attending the proceedings even when he was in a reclining position.
The scene which followed was one of the most dramatic of the entire
trial. As the court recorder stated, "The prisoner who was lying on a
lounge, partly raised himself, turning his face to the witness." The judge
advocate asked the attestor, "Do you recognize that man as the person
who shot your comrade?" Gray stated emphatically, "That is the man,"
obviously referring to the Swiss. The court recorder described Wirz's
reaction. "The prisoner attempted to say something in contradiction
of the witness, but was not permitted by the court." Chipman, clearly
sensing that he was onto an important moment, wanted to repeat the
scene. "The judge advocate requested the prisoner to stand up on his
feet. The prisoner having complied with the judge advocate's request,
the witness looked at him and said, 'I think that is the man."' 216 This
scene was dramatized in the press, and Wirz's lack of verbal response
to the accusation, his expression, his supposed collapse back on to the
couch were seen as some kind of admission of guilt.
When Wirz had a statement in his defense read to the court at
the end of the trial, he addressed the accusation that he had shot the
man named Stewart. The former commander stated that the testimony
was false. Stewart "is as much a creation of the fertile imagination of
the witness who testified to his murder by me .... The judge advocate
will not, I venture to say, find on any of the books of the Andersonville
prison the entry of that name and regiment. It will not be found in the
hospital record or the death register." 217 With such a common name,
it would be surprising if nothing similar was found, but the moniker
215
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and unit do not match Gray's testimony. A man listed as "Stewart, Wm
A." was among the tally of the dead, but he belonged to Union unit
from Virginia [not Minnesota], and he "died on July 25, [1864] [of]
icterus [jaundice]" not from a gun shot. 218 Additionally, a trooper from
Michigan with the similar name of Steward was among the dead. The
entry reads, "Steward, WV, ... died Sept 21, anasarca [edema] ." 219 Each
of these men died of natural causes, and neither of them appear to be the
William Stewart whom Gray said he saw killed. Wirz was correct, and
there is no clear evidence that the supposed victim ever existed.
Even though Gray was quite specific about the details of
Stewart's supposed death, he was a little less precise in the remainder
of his testimony. Early in his statement, the witness maintained, "I was
taken to Andersonville on the I 0 1h of June, 1864, and remained there until
November." A few minutes later Gray testified that he heard Wirz curse
the prisoners with the following words, "Damn those Yankees; they will
all be dead in a few days, anyhow." But the witness then gave the date
for this supposed incident. "That was, I think, some time in November or
December, 1864."220 While Gray could have heard Wirz say something
in November because he claimed he was still at Andersonville at that
time, but the date of December was impossible because, according to
his own admission, he was no longer in the prison.
Gray's statement that Wirz used his revolver to shoot Steward
might be inaccurate for another reason. In fact, all accounts of Wirz
shooting anyone with this pistols lack merit. As attested by a Union
prisoner, Frederick Guscetti, all the commander's side arms were
inoperable. A captive examined one of his pistols, and "when he pulled
back the hammer he found that the mainspring was broken." The witness
said that Wirz had two revolvers, and Guscetti had examined each of
them, but neither of them could function. "The mainspring of one of
those pistols was broken, and in the other there was no powder." 221
The most infamous and well-known incident of the shooting of
a prisoner was the "Chickamauga" affair because more testimony was
presented about him than any other episode at Andersonville. No less
218
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than twenty witnesses referred to the incident. They had either heard
about the episode or had seen it. No one knew Chickamauga's real name,
but some witnesses stated he was a Canadian who had volunteered for
the Union Army. 222 Apparently, the soldier had served at the battle of
Chickamauga in 1863 and was known to talk incessantly about that
engagement. He had been severely wounded, and one of his legs had
been amputated, creating a condition that forced him to walk with a
crutch. The man seemed to be somewhat strange or to have some kind
of mental disorder. As one attestor, James E. Marshall, stated: "The man
was supposed by the people in the camp to be crazy. I have no doubt
from his ways that he was crazy." 223 Obviously in derision, some of his
fellow prisoners called him "Mutton Head," "Fortune Teller," or "Pretty
Po 11 y.,,224
The witnesses to the shooting incident gave various dates for
its occurrence including the months of May and June. One man stated
that it took place between July 5 and 10, while another former prisoner
maintained it occurred on May 15. The accounts also vary considerably
in detail. Some said that Wirz ordered the guard to shoot the victim,
while others stated that the Swiss shot the prisoner himself. Reportedly,
Chickamauga was ingratiating himself to the guards by reporting the
attempts of some of the prisoners to tunnel out of the compound. The
other captives soon held him in derision, and they began to harass the
crippled man. Some even threatened to kill him. Apparently, the man
had reached his limit, or he had began to fear for his life , and he came to
the guards demanding that he be let out. When his request was refused,
he reportedly stood within the dead line and "begged the guard to shoot
him ."22s
According to various witnesses the cripple kept repeating similar
wishes including: "I would rather die than live in this place." 226 According
to another witness: "Chickamauga walked inside the dead-line and sat
down, saying he would rather be shot by their men [Confederate] than
222
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be killed by our own men." 227 Frederick Guscetti gave the most detailed
account. When Wirz threatened the man saying, "If you do not go inside
the dead-line I will shoot you," the prisoner then "bared his breast," as
though he was prepared to receive a bullet, and responded, "I do not
care; shoot me if you want to." In an affair that appeared to take a long
time to complete, the cripple kept returning across the dead line, and he
refused to be intimidated by the guards. When a sentry again told him to
leave the dead line, the man shouted back, "'I don't care,' and he opened
his blouse again." The guard finally shot and killed him. 228
In his written defense at the end of the trial, Wirz presented his
version of the incident. A sergeant told the commander, "that there was
a man within the dead-line, jawing with the sentry, and refusing to go
outside." Wirz rode his horse to the scene of the commotion. "I went up
to 'Chickamauga' and asked him, in rough tone of voice, what the hell
he was doing there." The man responded that he wanted to be killed.
Then the Swiss pulled out his revolver saying, "that if that was all he
wanted I would accommodate him." The threat seemed to work for a
moment, but the man again returned inside the dead line. Wirz related,
"I then, in his presence, and solely as a menace, told the sentry to shoot
him if he came in [within the dead line] again." The commander later
heard a shot and "hastened back" to see that the guard had shot the
crippled man. 229
In his account, Henry Wirz was surprisingly frank, and he had
not denied nor did he seem to whitewash his conduct in the matter. He
admitted that he had committed an error in judgment in thinking he
could cow a man into leaving the dead line when he appeared to be
bent on his own destruction. At the very worst, the Swiss could be seen
as callous or even criminally negligent in his off-handed orders to the
guard to shoot the crippled man. However, the situation had no easy
resolution, and Wirz faced a man who was not only tempting death but
inviting it. In all appearances, Chickamauga was committing "suicide
by cop," and unfortunately, the commander's order to the guard seemed
to accommodate the victim.
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A Weakened Defense
Baker was frustrated during the trial because Chipman refused
to allow the defense counsel to call many of his desired witnesses.
The lawyer wanted to call high Confederate officers and politicians
including General Lee, James Seddon, secretary of war; Stephen
Mallory, secretary of the navy; Samuel Moore, surgeon general; Robert
Ould, commissioner for prisoner exchange; "and others." The attorney
expected these men to testify to the fact that the South had too few
resources in food and transportation to feed their people properly, and
they had little left over to support prisoners of war, meaning that Wirz
was not responsible for the meager rations at Andersonville. In his
response, the judge advocate argued that these men were clearly guilty
of "one gigantic act of treason, one common conspiracy to overthrow
the government." The implication was that these men were criminals,
and they could be brought to justice some time in the future. In the
meantime, "until they are purged by special pardons, by a general
pardon or by acquittal before a competent court, no one of them ought
to be permitted to testify for his associates." 230
Curiously, Chipman apparently believed that many Southerners
were competent witnesses for the prosecution, probably meaning that
he had personally arranged for their pardon or some other reward in
each case. The judge advocate called approximately forty former
Confederate officials, army officers, and residents of Georgia and other
states nearby to testify against Wirz, and he saw their former affiliation
as no impediment to giving accurate testimony. However, the reverse
was not true, and Chipman often challenged the loyalty of Southerners
who testified for the Swiss. When Reverend E. B. Duncan, a Methodist
minister, testified that the water at Andersonville was not as polluted as
had been stated by the prosecution, Chipman attacked this seemingly
impeccable witness.
The judge advocate demanded to know if his loyalty had been
to the federal government or to the Confederacy during the war. The
minister asserted that he went with his state, Tennessee, after it left
the Union, but he maintained his neutrality as far as his office with his
religion was concerned. "I preached to souls everywhere-to federals
230
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and confederates." He added, "I never thought that the gospel had
anything to do with the question of government." Chipman then asked
Duncan if he thought the powers of Tennessee were superior to those of
the "general government." At this point, it was the witness who objected
to this line of examination by asking, "Is that question proper?" Chipman
maintained that it was. The fact that the judge advocate questioned the
loyalty or allegiance of the witnesses to the South during the war clearly
sidelined much of the testimony given for the defense. 23 1
The trial became rancorous on more than one occasion, and
Chipman even threatened the defense counsel with physical harm. When
Baker complained that the judge advocate had refused to subpoena an
important witness, Colonel Chipman took offense and appealed to the
court, "I ask the court to quiet the gentleman, or I will ask permission
to do it myself." Obviously, the judge advocate meant to physically
restrain the lawyer. At this point, Lew Wallace jumped in on the side of
the prosecuting attorney and told Baker he could make no statement to
the court even threatening to have the counsel for the defense removed
if he insisted on making an accusation. In frustration , the lawyer stated
that he would "have to correct the matter outside if I am not allowed
to do so here." Baker's observation was probably nothing more than a
desire to talk with Chipman about the matter, but the judge advocate
turned it into some kind of a physical challenge, and he retorted, "Then
I will meet you on any occasion, and in any place." 232
Soon after this exchange Baker, seeing he was unable to call
the desired witnesses , closed the case for the defense . General Wallace
gave the defense only four days to prepare its closing statements which
were read in court on October 18, 1865. Wirz maintained, "I am no
lawyer, gentlemen, and this statement is prepared without the aid of my
counsel." The accused presented a "solemn affirmation of innocence."
The Swiss prisoner outlined the case against him and did his best to
refute the charges. He even went so far as to suggest, "If I have violated
the laws of war if I have outraged humanity, if I have perpetrated any of
the murders or atrocities laid to my charge, let me suffer. But I hope to
be able to convince the court that I am not guilty." 233
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The defendant stated that he never personally killed anyone,
and that the charges of some kind of conspiracy to kill Union soldiers
were absurd. He maintained that, "I am not conscious of there being one
particle of testimony in the entire record going to establish the charge or
giving even faint color of probability to its existence. Out of the 160 [sic]
witnesses that have testified before this court, has any one said that I was
every heard or known to have uttered a syllable or done an act tending to
show my knowledge of the existence of such a hellish plot?" He added,
"there is not a shadow of testimony by which it can be proven that it [deaths
at Andersonville] can be proven that it was the fruit of a conspiracy." As
to his conduct in administering the prison, Wirz stated that he followed
lawful orders. He "merely obeyed the legal orders of my superiors in the
discharge of my official duties." 234 His statement in his own defense was
well reasoned, passionate, and logical, and it fell on deaf ears .
The judge advocate gave his summation of the evidence against
the defendant after Wirz 's presentation. This meant that the tribunal
heard Chipman's arguments last when his statements would carry more
weight in their decisions as to Wirz 's guilt or innocence. Since the
evidence suggests that the commission found the defendant guilty before
he was ever tried, the order in which the summations were presented
probably made no difference in the outcome of the trial. However, the
sequence in which they were given once again indicates that the court
gave no advantage to Wirz.
Colonel Chipman presented his summation over two days,
October 20 and 21, and it was very lengthy. These final arguments were
eighty pages long when printed , and it included 60 ,000 words or more,
which is about twice as long as this article excluding footnotes. Even if it
were lacking in substance, the length of this summation alone would give
the impression that the evidence against Wirz was overwhelming. Some
of the judge advocate's arguments made little sense or were designed
to reignite fears against the South. He made nebulous statements such
as , "many things are proper to be time of peace, which in time of war
become high crimes." This included such questionable infractions as, "a
timid loyalty" or "yielding to doubtful and hasty clamor," 235 as though
it was necessary to find the defendant guilty as a matter of patriotism .
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The counsel for the defense had argued that the court had no
jurisdiction over the defendant because the war was over and military
tribunals were unnecessary and illegal. Clearly in an appeal to play on
the fears of a renewed uprising, the prosecuting attorney argued, "The
war is not over. True the muskets of treason are stacked; the armies of the
rebellion are dissolved; ... but by far the largest portion [of Southerners
are], sullen, silent, vengeful, stand ready to seize every opportunity to
divide the loyal sentiment of the country and with spirit unbroken and
defiant, would this day raise the standard of rebellion if they dared hope
for success." 236 Anxiety is a powerful motivator, and Chipman's appeal
indicated that constant vigilance was required. Taken in context of the
judge advocate's closing statements, these arguments meant that Wirz
had to be found guilty for national defense.
The prosecuting attorney repeated much testimony presented
at the trial that was carefully selected to make the defendant look as
bad as possible. While many of his arguments were based on unreliable
testimony, his most questionable assertions related to the charge of
conspiracy against the leaders of the Confederacy. Colonel Chipman
said they were guilty of a large number of crimes from the treatment of
captives in Libby Prison and Belle Isle, to the use of guerilla warfare,
to sabotage, to the spread of infections, to the execution of prisoners
of war, to the use of land mines against soldiers, and to many other
questionable assertions. 237 The logic of these accusations was that since
the Confederate leaders were responsible for the war, then they were
directly responsible for everything that happened in it. Additionally,
Chipman argued that if the Rebel leaders knew of the nature of the war,
and by extension the conditions at Andersonville, and they did not solve
these problems, then they were responsible for them. 238
The Verdict
The tribunal presented its "findings" on October 24, 1865. The
commission first stated the guilt of many Confederate officials as though
finding these men culpable was the first and most important aspect of the
trial. "Henry Wirz, did combine, confederate, and conspire with them,
236
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the said Jefferson Davis, James
A. Seddon , Howell Cobb, John H
Winder, Richard B. Winder, Isaiah
H. White, W. S. Winder, W. Shelby
Reed, R.R. Stevenson, S. P. Moore
[Dr.] Kerr . . . James Duncan,
Wesley W. Burner, Benjamin
Harris, and others who names are
unknown." And they "maliciously,
traitorously, and in violation of
the war, to impair and injure the
health and to destroy the lives, .
. . the number of about forty-five
thousand soldiers in the military
service of the United States of
American, held as prisoners of war
John H. Winder.
at
Andersonville." 239
Courtesy : Library of Congress.
The court had found these
men guilty even though no evidence had been presented on the nature
of their supposed crimes. None of these men had appeared in court
or had been formally brought to trial. They had never been given
the benefit of defense counsel, had never been allowed to present
evidence asserting their innocence, and had never even been formally
informed that they were on trial. The proceedings at the trial were
clearly outside the bounds of all rules of jurisprudence, and the verdict
against them was criminally absurd. Significantly while the tribunal
found these men guilty of conspiring to commit murder, the court gave
them no punishment for their crimes. This charade played well in the
northern press, and the entire trial was clearly intended to take away
any possible blame from the federal government on the high death
rates of Union prisoners of war. Incidentally, some of these men who
had been found "guilty" were never arrested or incarcerated. Of those
who were held in jail , all of them were released within two years and
suffered no additional punishments.
The eminent Civil War historian , James McPherson, has argued
that the accusations made against the leaders of the South that they were
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involved in some conspiracy to abuse prisoners are incorrect. "Few if
any historians would now contend that the Confederacy deliberately
mistreated prisoners. Rather, they would concur with contemporary
opinions-held by some northerners as well as southerners-that a
deficiency of resources and deterioration of the southern economy were
mainly responsible for the sufferings of Union prisoners. The South
could not feed its own soldiers and civilians; how could it feed enemy
prisoners? The Confederacy could not supply its own troops with enough
tents; how could it provide tents for captives? A certain makeshift quality
in southern prisoner administration, a lack of planning and efficiency,
also contributed to the plight of prisoners." 240
The commission turned its attention to the second charge against
Wirz, and the tribunal then found Wirz guilty of ten of the thirteen
specifications against him. The sentence was specific. "And the court do
therefore sentence him, the said Henry Wirz, to be hanged by the neck
till he be dead, at such time and place as the President of the United
States may direct, two-thirds of the members of the court concurring
herein." Lew Wallace signed the statement.241
Recent historians have almost been unanimous in condemning
the proceedings and the verdict. As Robert Scott Davis has affirmed.
"His trial failed to produce any credible account of his acting with
personal cruelty or evidence of his role in any conspiracy." He further
stated that the trial was "only a formality for a defendant facing
the gallows at the hands of a prejudiced court." 242 Other historians
have been equally critical. William Marvel stated that "Wirz was a
dead man from the start." Ovid L. Futch wrote that the trial was a
"legal lynching of Wirz." Charles W. Sanders claimed "that the entire
proceeding was a sham-and a poorly executed sham at that." The
lawyer, Glen W. LaForce, agreed stating that "the trial of Henry Wirz
was worse than a mistake, worse even than a miscarriage of justice.
The trial of ... Wirz was a national disgrace. Vengeance, not justice,
had been served ." 243
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The irregularities in the trial, the biased nature of the court,
and the suspect evidence against Wirz clearly indicate that he should
have been released. However, a few doubts remain. The author, John
W. Lynn, stated that "15 or 16" men gave testimony at his trial, and
an additional fifteen men wrote accounts later, stating that they had
seen Wirz kill at least one Union soldier. Lynn then asked the question,
"Did all 30 of these persons perjure themselves?" 244 No doubt all these
witnesses could have been mistaken especially when heavy prejudices
were involved much like the hundreds of people who believe that they
have seen Elvis Presley years after the rock legend had died. 245 These
"Elvis sightings" may be dismissed as wishful thinking by prejudiced
observers, and the accounts of men who claim to have seen Wirz kill
someone may be in the same category.
The Question of Responsibility
Not doubt, Wirz considered himself to be innocent of all crimes,
and he convinced his closest associates of that fact in the months before
his execution. As a matter of practicality there were two persons whom
the Swiss would not dare mislead: his defense counsel who needed
all relevant facts to prepare a proper defense, and the Catholic priest
to whom to confessed his sins. As Wirz stated at the beginning of
his trial, "My conscience is clear. I have never dealt cruelly with a
prisoner under my charge. If they suffered for the want of shelter, food,
clothing and necessaries, I could not help it, having no control over
these things ." 246
Wirz's attorney, Louis Schade, maintained his entire life that
the Swiss guard was innocent. "Protesting up to the last moment his
innocence of those monstrous crimes with which he was charged, he
received my word that, having failed to save him from a felon's doom,
I would, as long as I lived, do everything in my power to clear his
memory. I did that the more readily, as I was then already perfectly
convinced that he suffered wrongfully." 247
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The Catholic Priest, Father F. E. Boyle, was Wirz's confessor,
and he heard the condemned man's confessions for weeks before his
execution. The Swiss would never dare lie to his priest because that
would place his soul in jeopardy. While Church law forbade Father
Boyle from ever divulging the co ntent of Wirz's admissions to him ,
the priest gave a summation of what the condemned man said. "I know
that he was, indeed, innocent of all the cruel charges on which hi s life
was sworn away, and l was edified by the Christian spirit in which he
sub mitted to his persecutors."""~
The night before Wirz was hanged, government agents came to
see the condemned man in jail. One of them approached Father Boyle
first. "I know that, on the evening before the execution of Major [sic]
Wirz, a man visited me , on the part of a cabinet officer, to inform me that
Major Wirz would be pardoned if he would implicate Jefferson Davis
in the crue lties of Andersonvill e." 24 'J These agents came to the captive
the same night and offered him a pardon to implicate Jefferson Davis
in the crimes at Andersonville. Wirz
rejected this bribe with contempt as
he told a companion. 'These men
have just offered me my liberty if I
will testify against Mr. Davis, and
incriminate him with the charges
against the Andersonville Prison.
I to ld them that I could not do
this. as l neither knew Mr. Davis
personally. officially or socially, but
if they expected with the offer of
my miserable life to purchase me to
treason and treachery to the South
they had unde rvalued me." 250
On November 10 , 1865,theday
of his exec ution , Wirz was concerned
Jefferson Davis
about his wife and c hildren , and
24

'

9
''
50
'

Boyle "'Le tter" to .Jefferson Davis as cited in Ashe. "frial and Dearh, 44.

Ibid.
Quoted by Ri c hard Winder in James J. Williamson. Prison Life in the Old
Capitol and Reminiscences of the Civil War (West Orange. N.J. : np .. 1911), 139 . See
a lso , C. 8. Winder and F. E. Boy le in The Death and Trial of f-/e11rv Wir~. <Raleigh: Uzzell. 1908) , 44-5.

94

November 2014 SAHS Review

Execution of Wirz: Securing the Noose. Courtesy: Library of Congress.
he sent a Jetter pleading that they be helped financially. Henry Wirz
was taken to the place of execution, and a long list of accusations were
read to him as he stood on the scaffold. When asked if he had any last
words, Wirz replied, "No sir; only that I am innocent, and will die like
a man, my hopes being in the future. I go before my God, the Almighty
God, and he will judge between me and you." The soldiers detailed to
watch the execution were chanting, "Hang him," "Andersonville," and
"Remember Andersonville." Wirz fell when the trap door was released,
but the rope failed to break his neck, and he writhed in agony for twenty
minutes before he strangled to death. 25 1 At least, federal revenge ended
at that point, and there were no more executions for war crimes.
While Wirz was the only person executed for the tragedy at
25 1
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Wirz 's vertabrae proving that his neck was not broken.
Courtesy: National Museum of Health and Medicine.

Andersonville, the actual responsibility for the high mortality at that
prison must be shared by numerous others , and the Swiss probably bore
less guilt than many who went free. In many cases , recent historians
have been reluctant to assign blame for much of the needless suffering
of prisoners during the Civil War. Some of them have indicated that
they do not want to stir up sectional feelings again by presenting a case
for accountability. Rather they often blame war itself. Hesseltine has
argued, "the atrocities of the prison camps were only phases of the
greater atrocity of war itself." Benjamin G. Cloyd has a lso summarized
some of these assertions, "Left unsaid , but strongly implied, was an
acceptance that modern war, and not individual human choices and
actions , inevitably caused such disasters" as took place in the prison
camps . Professor Cloyd added, "The overall trend of these prison
histories was clear. The objective removal of responsibility for the
suffering" in the camps, and it was "the fortunes of war [that] doomed
Civil War prisoners to their fate ." 252
The view that anything on such a huge scale might happen in the
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area of human affairs without the contribution of people is misleading.
Every outcome was a product of established policies and procedures,
which were often enacted at the highest levels of government in both
the Union and Confederacy. The historian Charles W. Sanders, Jr.
has argued that the presidents of both sides of the conflict bear much
responsibility for the disastrous treatment of prisoners. Sanders stated
that Jefferson Davis knew of the condition of the camps, and, contrary
to a popular interpretation, had the ability to bring aid to the men in
them. The historian maintains that the South had ample amounts of
food, and it also had the means of transporting it to the prison camps.
Therefore, hunger in the cities of the South and among the Confederate
troops in the field were only short lived, and most of the time these
citizens and soldiers had adequate food. "The fundamental reason for
the appalling state of the camps was that although senior officials in
the Confederate government knew that hundreds of Union prisoners
were dying daily from the effects of starvation, exposure and disease,
they declined to make decisions or initiate actions that would have
improved the conditions under which the prisoners were held." But he
still criticized the refusal to exchange prisoners. "In the end, the dying
in southern camps ceased only when exchanges were resumed in the
spring of 1865 ."253
Charles W. Sanders leveled criticism against the Lincoln
administration as well. The historian maintained that Lincoln "knew
about the operation of northern camps or the treatment of Confederate
prisoners of war," which led to the very heavy death rate among them.
But the rail-splitter president used his subordinates, most importantly
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, to carry out presidential policies.
This included "coolly and deliberately choos[ing] to withhold food,
supplies, and medical care-all of which was readily available." Sanders
summed up Lincoln's responsibility. "In the end, Abraham Lincoln must
be held as accountable as his subordinates for the shameful history of
the Union prisoner-of-war system." 254
Ultimately, many men shared some responsibility for the tragedy
of Andersonville. They include General Grant for following the Lincoln
administration in refusing to exchange prisoners, General Sherman
for refusing to bring aid to the various prison camps that were within
253
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reach of his army, a number of Confederate officials including Wirz's
immediate commanders at the prison who did too little to solve the
problems of food and sanitation, and Jefferson Davis who diverted too
few resources to help the captives. Edwin Stanton andAbraham Lincoln
must be included in this list for refusing to deal with the problems of
prisoner exchange and sending supplies to captives in Southern prisons .
With so much guilt to be shared, the prosecution and execution of Wirz
was unjustified. Of all these men, Henry Wirz was probably the least
responsible for the high mortality at Andersonville. In fact, he likely
deserves high praise for doing what he could to improve the desperate
conditions in the prison, and he probably saved many Union prisoners
who would have perished without his efforts.
- Brigham Young University

